Are market-based measures of global systemic importance of financial institutions useful to regulators and supervisors? by Zhang,  Q. et al.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
04 December 2015
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Zhang, Q. and Vallascas, F. and Keasey, K. and Cai, C. X. (2015) 'Are market-based measures of global
systemic importance of ﬁnancial institutions useful to regulators and supervisors?', Journal of money, credit
and banking., 47 (7). pp. 1403-1442.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12249
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is the accepted version of the following article: Zhang, Q., Vallascas, F., Keasey, K. and Cai, C. X. (2015), Are
Market-Based Measures of Global Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions Useful to Regulators and
Supervisors?. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 47(7): 1403-1442, which has been published in ﬁnal form at
https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12249. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley
Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
 1 
Are Market-Based Measures of Global Systemic Importance of 
Financial Institutions Useful to Regulators and Supervisors? 
 
 
 
 
Qi Zhang 
a
, FrancescoVallascas 
b
, Kevin Keasey 
c
 and Charlie X. Cai
 d 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL Classification: G28 
Key words: Market-Measures of Systemic Importance, Financial Crises, Regulation. 
 
a  Associate Professor in Finance, Leeds University Business School, Maurice Keyworth Building, 
University of Leeds, Leeds, UK, LS2 9JT. Email: Q.Zhang@leeds.ac.uk. 
b  Professor in Banking, Leeds University Business School, Maurice Keyworth Building, The 
University of Leeds, UK, LS2 9JT. Email: fv@lubs.leeds.ac.uk. 
c  Professor and Director of the International Institute of Banking and Financial Services (IIBFS), 
Leeds University Business School, Maurice Keyworth Building, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK, 
LS2 9JT. Email: kk@lubs.leeds.ac.uk. 
d  Corresponding author: Charlie X. Cai, Professor of Finance, Leeds, Leeds University Business 
School, Maurice Keyworth Building, The University of Leeds, UK, LS2 9JT. Tel: +44 (0)113 343 
7801; Email: X.Cai@lubs.leeds.ac.uk. 
 
 
 2 
 
Abstract 
We analyze whether four market-based measures of the global systemic importance of financial 
institutions offer early warning signals during three financial crises. The tests based on the 
2007/2008 crisis show that only one measure (∆CoVaR) consistently adds predictive power to 
conventional early warning models. However, the additional predictive power remains small and 
it is not normally confirmed for the Asian and the 1998 crises. We conclude that it is problematic 
to identify a market-based measure of systemic importance that remains valid across crises with 
different features. The same criticism also applies to several conventional proxies of systemic 
importance, of which size is the most consistent performer. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The recent global financial crisis has highlighted the sheer scale of the negative externalities 
that might result from instabilities in the financial industry. Numerous countries have been 
forced to rely on very significant amounts of public funds to bailout financial institutions and 
have suffered from a dramatic slowdown in economic growth and social unrest (Dieckmann and 
Plank 2012, Ötker-Robe and Podpiera 2013, Veronesi and Zingales 2010). While there seems to 
be a plurality of causes of this global turmoil (Allen and Carletti 2010, Brunnermeier 2009, 
Purnanandam 2011), it is widely believed that the inadequacy of the financial regulatory 
framework has exacerbated the effects of the crisis (Acharya et al. 2009, Houston, Lin and Ma 
2012).i Therefore, it is not surprising that one key response to the global financial crisis has been 
the design of a new regulatory framework that aims to enhance the resilience of both individual 
banks and the whole financial system to shocks (Basel Committee 2011, Keys et al. 2009).   
A crucial component of the new regulatory framework is a stricter regime for systemically 
important financial institutions. These are conventionally defined as institutions “whose distress 
or disorderly failure, because of their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would 
cause significant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity” (Financial 
Stability Board 2011). The regulatory focus, given the worldwide negative effects produced by 
the defaults of large and international financial institutions during the crisis, is in particular on 
“Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions” (GSIFIs), that have the potential to 
generate negative effects across different countries (Basel Committee 2011, Financial Stability 
Board 2009).ii  A potential support to the regulatory and supervisory activity in dealing with 
global systemically important financial institutions might come from the numerous market based 
measures of systemic importance that have been mostly proposed in the aftermath of the global 
crisis (see for instance Acharya, Engle, and Richardson 2012, Adrian and Brunnermeier 2011, 
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Brownlees and Engle 2012, Huang, Zhou, and Zhu 2012, Lopez-Espinosa et al. 2012, Puzanova 
and Düllmann 2012).  
The potential use of the market-based measures by regulators and supervisors varies with the 
theoretical perspectives that they adopt on how to define how much each financial institution is 
responsible for financial instability. More specifically, some of these measures focus on the 
implications of a financial institution’s distress on the rest of the financial system and are then 
potentially useful to control ex-post systemic damages that might arise from distress conditions 
at the firm level (see for instance the measures in Adrian and Brunnermeier 2011 and Lopez-
Espinosa et al. 2012). Hence, they can be regulatory tools to guide timely actions in periods of 
systemic crises. Other measures emphasize the degree of vulnerability of a financial institution in 
the case of a systemic shock (see Acharya, Engle, and Richardson 2012, Brownlees and Engle 
2012, Huang, Zhou, and Zhu 2012, Puzanova and Düllmann 2012, and Lehar 2005). It follows 
that they are supposed to be useful when the purpose of supervisors is to design ex-ante 
interventions that help to reduce the number of defaults in the financial industry when a systemic 
crisis materializes. In spite of the highlighted theoretical differences, all types of measures have to 
satisfy a key requirement if they aim at being incorporated as valuable tools within the regulatory 
and supervisory framework; namely, they have to offer information that is not already present in 
more conventional risk proxies. In other words, they have to signal something not already 
known to regulators and supervisors on the basis of conventional drivers of systemic risk that are 
available at the firm level.  
In this paper, we assess whether the above key requirement is satisfied by four market-based 
measures of systemic importance that we apply to a global setting. More precisely, we conduct a 
comparative assessment for an international sample of large financial institutions of the 
additional early warning signals of systemic importance that these market-based measures might 
offer to regulators and supervisors before the eruption of a financial crisis. In our empirical 
setting, therefore, the incorporation within the regulatory and supervisory framework of these 
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market-based measures is justified by their ability to offer early warning signals on systemic 
importance that are not already provided by simpler firm characteristics that have been 
conventionally linked to systemic risk.  
To conduct our analysis, we employ four measures of systemic importance that have been 
recently proposed in the literature that we compute for an international sample of large financial 
institutions representing, during the analyzed period, on average around 80% of the total assets 
and market capitalization of the worldwide listed financial companies. More specifically, we 
select two types of measures that differ in their possible use by regulators and supervisors. The 
first type includes ∆CoVaR as proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeir (2011) and its variant 
∆A_CoVaR suggested by Lopez-Espinosa et al. (2012) and captures risk-spillovers from a 
financial institution to the rest of the financial system. Hence, these measures are supposed to 
signal the potential systemic damages associated with distress conditions at the firm level so as to 
help timely regulatory interventions during systemic crises. The second type includes the SRISK 
indicator proposed by Brownlees and Engle (2012) and further developed by Acharya, Engle, 
and Richardson (2012) and the contribution to the variance of the systemic Expected shortfall 
(EXSHORT) as in Lehar (2005). These measures quantify the degree of vulnerability of financial 
institutions in the presence of a systemic shock and consequently they are expected to be useful 
when the purpose is to design ex-ante supervisory interventions to reduce the number of 
defaults from a systemic shock.  More generally, these four measures share two attributes that are 
desirable to regulators. First, they can be computed with readily available data (as they simply rely 
on market and accounting information) that can be obtained over a long time period. Second, in 
contrast to other methodologies (see for instance, Drehmann and Tarashev 2011b), their 
computation does not impose any restriction in terms of sample size. Therefore, these measures 
can be easily computed for our extensive worldwide sample of large financial institutions - 
including banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions - selected over the period 
from 1992 to 2006.  
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We start our empirical analysis by using the global financial crisis as a laboratory to test 
whether the predictive performance of an early warning model (where different measures of the 
realized systemic importance of financial institutions during this crisis are used as the dependent 
variable) based on firm characteristics improves when one of the market-based measures of 
global systemic importance is included as an additional explanatory variable. We define the 
realized systemic importance during the crisis on the basis of measures that mostly capture the 
potential systemic damages that can derive from an insolvency condition at the firm level and 
with measures of degree of vulnerability of a financial institution to the exposure of a systemic 
shock. The first proxies of realized systemic importance are expected to be primarily predicted by 
∆CoVaR and ∆A_CoVaR, while the second set of measures of the realized systemic importance 
should be predicted, in particular, by SRISK and EXSHORT. 
The results of these tests identify ∆CoVaR as the only market-based measure that significantly 
explains the different notions of realized systemic importance computed over the global financial 
crisis event. ∆CoVaR, therefore, offers early warning signals not only of the potential ex-post 
systemic damages that can arise from financial institution distress, as implied by its theoretical 
foundations, but also in terms of the vulnerability of these institutions to the occurrence of a 
systemic shock. Overall, the additional predictive power remains, however, rather small 
compared to more conventional firm characteristics, and in particular to firm size.  
The other three market-based measures of systemic importance show generally much less 
additional predictive power when compared to firm characteristics. The asymmetric version of 
the conventional ∆CoVaR only occasionally demonstrates some predictive power, while SRISK 
and EXSHORT show some significant predictive ability only when the focus is on a specific 
definition of vulnerability; that is, the vulnerability of financial institutions in terms of capital 
shortfall. By contrast, they do not show any predictive power when the vulnerability is based on 
the decline in market value suffered during the crisis. These conclusions hold when the analysis 
is limited to the sub-sample of banks, when the prediction models are extended with the addition 
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of further firm characteristics and when we follow Acharya, Engle, and Pierret (2014) and Engle, 
Jondeau, and Rockinger (2014) to control for the potential distortions generated on our results 
by the use of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by some of the financial 
institutions in our sample. 
Next, we conduct a second set of tests with the purpose of evaluating whether the predictive 
performances of the selected market-based measures of systemic importance during the global 
crisis, and in particular the ability of ∆CoVaR to enter (all prediction models) with a significant 
coefficient, reflect a general economic rationale or are the result of an optimal methodology 
design that captures the specificities of the global crisis. This concern is motivated by the fact 
that three out the four market-based measures we analyze in this study have been proposed in 
the aftermath of the global financial crisis with an obvious focus on those aspects of systemic 
risk that have emerged as pivotal during this crisis. 
We, therefore, evaluate whether these market-measures show similar predictive performances 
as for the global financial crisis when we focus on other crisis episodes by employing a similar 
empirical strategy. We select two crises that occurred in the nineties that are normally recognized 
as having global relevance and that have often been at the core of previous empirical studies on 
systemic risk and bank performance (Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz 2012, Sedunov 2012, 
Weiß, Bonstandzic, and Neumann 2014): the Asian financial crisis that erupted in the second 
half of 1997 and the Russian and the Long Term Capital Management (LTMC) crisis that started 
in the second half of 1998. Notably, in our sample the Asian crisis has a significantly milder 
impact than the 1998 crisis and this allows us to also evaluate whether the severity of a crisis 
plays any role in the predictive power of the chosen market-based measures of systemic 
importance. 
In these additional tests, we find a very low degree of consistency compared to the results for 
the global financial crisis. ∆CoVaR does not confirm its ability to consistently predict different 
notions of the realized degree of systemic importance, suggesting that some of its predictive 
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power during the global crisis can be indeed explained by the specificities of this crisis. 
Furthermore, all measures show very disappointing predictive power in the majority of the tests 
on the 1998 crisis; namely, they do not offer particular support to regulators and supervisors 
especially in the crisis event that appears closer to the recent crisis in terms of its negative impact 
on the financial institutions included in our sample. Overall, putting together the results of the 
three crisis tests we observe that some degree of consistency only emerges when the focus is on 
the prediction of a narrow definition of the vulnerability of financial institutions in terms of 
capital adequacy. In this respect a key role is played by SRISK and, to a minor extent, by 
EXSHORT. 
Our tests highlight the difficulty of identifying a market-based measure of systemic 
importance that remains valid across financial crises that present different features. From our 
analysis, however, it seems that this also applies to several conventional proxies employed by 
regulators to identify the most global systemically important financial institutions. Among these 
conventional measures, size is the most consistent performer across the recent global crisis and 
the 1998 crisis; namely, in those crises with the largest impact on the financial institutions 
included in our sample.  This result of firm size being a more consistent performer than market-
based measures of systemic importance echoes Danielsson et al’s (2014) conclusion that the use 
of basic firm-characteristics is preferable to the adoption of more complex approaches in 
shaping regulatory actions. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical setting of our 
tests -including the selected market measures of systemic importance, the data and the main 
dependent and explanatory variables employed in the prediction tests. Section 3 presents the 
empirical results and robustness tests for the prediction analysis that employs the global financial 
crisis as a laboratory, while Section 4 reports additional tests for two further crisis episodes: the 
Asian crisis that erupted in the second half of 1997 and the 1998 crisis. Section 5 discusses our 
key findings and offers conclusions. 
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2 EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY, SAMPLE AND CONTROL 
VARIABLES 
2.1 Empirical Methodology  
We assess the usefulness of four market-based measures of systemic importance for 
regulators and supervisors by their ability to offer early warning signals of global systemic 
importance over and above what can be obtained by employing more conventional risk-drivers 
based on firm characteristics. Essentially, we argue that the ability of market-based measures to 
offer early warning signals is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for their incorporation in 
the regulatory framework if similar signals can be obtained by using alternative and simpler 
indicators of systemic importance. Our empirical framework is, therefore, based on the 
estimation of a prediction model where measures of the realized systemic importance during 
episodes of financial crises, which we define in section 2.3, are explained by firm characteristics. 
We then assess whether the prediction performance of these models improves when one market-
based measure of systemic importance is included as an additional predictor. In other words, we 
evaluate i) the degree of significance of the market-based measures of systemic importance when 
they are added to benchmark models based on conventional firm characteristics and ii) the 
related additional explanatory power (R-squared) that it is provided to these models. 
The market-based measures of systemic importance include in the analysis consist  of the 
∆CoVaR measure as in Adrian and Brunnermeier and its variant formulated by Lopez-Espinosa 
et al. (2012), named henceforth ∆A_CoVaR, with the addition of the measures proposed by 
Brownlees and Engle (2012) and Lehar (2005), named as respectively SRISK and EXSHORT in 
the following sections. ∆CoVaR and ∆A_CoVAR are examples of a bottom-up approach 
(Drehmann and Tarashev; 2011a) in quantifying systemic importance; namely, the degree of 
systemic importance is quantified on the basis of the negative implications for the system 
produced by the distress conditions of a financial institution. Under this approach, therefore, the 
 10 
theoretical causation runs from the financial institution to the system. SRISK and EXSHORT 
are instead examples of a top-down approach in quantifying systemic importance where the 
preliminary step to the assessment process is the quantification of the total amount of systemic 
risk that is then allocated to different components of the financial system. Thus, the theoretical 
causation runs from the system to the financial institution. We provide details of the estimation 
method that has been adopted in this study for each measure in the Appendix.  
We select these four measures on the basis of two criteria. First, computations have to rely on 
readily available data that can be collected over an extensive time period. Second, a measure can 
be computed for a large sample of financial institutions in a global system. These criteria exclude 
the estimation of any contribution approach that uses Shapley Values to allocate systemic risk – 
this is due to the dimensionality problem associated with this type of analysis.iii Similarly, models 
that require the estimation of the joint probabilities of failures, as in Segoviano and Goodhart 
(2009) and Zhou (2010), are excluded as their estimation becomes problematic in large datasets. 
These criteria also exclude measures that require the computation of the implied default 
probability from Credit Default Swaps (CDS) as in Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2012). This is 
because CDS are not normally available for a long time period and an extensive international 
sample of financial institutions 
Our initial and main tests employ the global financial crisis as a laboratory. We estimate the 
additional informative content that regulators and supervisors would have obtained by using 
these market based measures as additional predictors of the realized systemic importance of 
financial institutions during this crisis. Following Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and Fahlenbrach, 
Prilmeier, and Stulz (2012), the length of the crisis spans from 2nd July 2007 to 31st December, 
2008. The prediction model is then estimated on the basis of accounting and market data 
available at the end of 2006. More precisely, to avoid forward looking bias, we estimate daily 
values for the four market measures of systemic importance with the accounting and market data 
available up to the end of 2006 using an estimation window of five years. In essence, we take the 
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perspective of a regulator/supervisor that has opted to measure the degree of systemic 
importance of financial institutions at the end of year 2006 before the eruption of the global 
shock. We then use the average values of these measures in year 2006 as an additional control in 
our prediction model. Notably, our results remain qualitatively unchanged if we employ a longer 
estimation window to estimate the market measures of systemic importance. 
As detailed in the Appendix, some of these measures, namely, SRISK and EXSHORT require 
the use of both market and accounting data in the estimation process. This raises a possible bias 
in the measurement of systemic importance due to the fact that before the global crisis some 
companies in our sample have moved to the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS). 
This is, in particular, the case of numerous European financial institutions for which the 
adoption of IFRS became compulsory since 2005. While our initial tests on the global financial 
crisis do not deliberately control for this possible bias, in section 3.3 we conduct additional 
analyses that aim to remove any concerns over the impact of accounting standards on our 
results.  In particular, as IFRS is supposed to have an impact on the size of a company balance 
sheet, we follow Acharya, Engle, and Pierret (2014) and Engle, Jondeau, and Rockinger (2014) 
and adopt a milder 5.5% minimum capital requirement rather than the 8% for all the companies 
that at the end of 2006 claimed to follow these accounting principles in the estimation of capital 
shortfall. As this adjustment implies that the values of total liabilities under IFRS are around 45% 
larger than under other accounting principles, we then re-estimate EXSHORT with an increase 
in the value of debt of 45% for IFRS companies.  Notably, the problem of accounting standards 
can also potentially affect the estimation of the two ∆CoVaR measures. As suggested by Adrian 
and Brunnermeier (2011) and Danielsson et al. (2014), ∆CoVaR can be implemented both by 
using observable equity returns or estimated asset returns that are then influenced by accounting 
data. We have opted to follow Danielsson et al. (2014) and estimate these measures by using 
easily observable equity returns given that this reduces errors-in-variables problems including 
those related to differences in accounting principles across companies.iv  
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A second set of tests evaluates whether the predictive performance of the selected market-
based measure of systemic importance during the global crisis is motivated by a general 
economic rationale or is simply the result of an optimal methodology design that simply captures 
the specificities of the global crisis. This is because the majority of the market-based measures of 
systemic importance we analyze have been proposed in the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis with a focus on those aspects of systemic risk that have emerged as pivotal during this 
crisis. We, therefore, test whether these market-measures predict the realized systemic importance 
of financial institutions in other crisis episodes by adopting a similar empirical strategy as used 
for the global financial crisis. We focus on the two crises that occurred in the nineties that are 
normally recognized as having an international relevance and that have often been at the core of 
previous empirical studies on systemic risk and bank performance (Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and 
Stulz 2012, Sedunov 2012, Weiß, Bonstandzic, and Neumann 2014): the Asian financial crisis 
erupted in the second half of 1997 and the Russian and the LTCM crisis that started in the 
second half of 1998.  
We identify the start of the Asian crisis on the 2nd of July 1997, as in Weiß, Bonstandzic, and 
Neumann (2014) and the start of the 1998 crisis on the 3rd of August, as in Fahlenbrach, 
Prilmeier, and Stulz (2012). More problematic, however, is the identification of an end date for 
these two crises. We address this issue by following an approach similar to Fahlenbrach, 
Prilmeier, and Stulz (2012). They quantify the performance of a financial institution under the 
1998 crisis from the 3rd of August 1998 to the day of the lowest return at the company level up 
to December 1998. We modify this approach to maintain a consistent time frame across 
companies and to focus on the systemic dimension of these two crises. As a result, for each 
episode the end day is the lowest value of the Datastream World index for the financial industry; 
the 12th November 1997 for the Asian crisis and the 5th October 1998 for the 1998 crisis. 
It is worth noting that the two crises appear quite different in terms of global impact. 
During the period from July 1997 to 12th November, 1997, the global financial sector index 
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declined by around 10%, while from August 1998 to 5th October, 1998, the decline in value was 
equal to about 30%. This difference in the crises gives us the opportunity to assess whether, 
outside the global financial crisis, the predictive performance of the four market-measures of 
systemic importance varies with the severity of the crisis episode. This is particularly important 
from a regulatory and supervisory perspective given that it would be preferable that these 
measures offer more effective early warning signals when a crisis might generate a more severe 
impact on the stability of the global financial system. As in our main test, to conduct these 
additional analyses, we estimate the four market-based measures of systemic importance using 
accounting and market information for the five years before the eruption of the shock and the 
average for the last available year is then employed as the predictor in our empirical tests.  
2.2 Data 
We conduct our analyzes on an international sample of large financial institutions and employ 
market and accounting data for the period spanning from 1, January, 1992 to 31, December, 
2006. More precisely, our initial tests based on the global financial crisis require data for the 
period from 2002 to 2006 to estimate our market-based measures of systemic importance, while 
the additional tests to evaluate the performance of these measures under different crises periods 
such as the Asian Crisis in 1997 and the 1998 crisis are based, respectively, on the periods 1992-
1996 and 1993-1997. 
In the selection of financial institutions, similar to Brownlees and Engle (2012), we start the 
sampling process from the list of publicly traded financial institutions at the end of 2006 as 
available from Datastream International. The list includes banks, insurance companies and 
financial services firms, such as investment banks, consumer finance companies and firms 
engaged in asset management. From this group of financial institutions, we select financial firms 
in the list of the top 300 institutions in terms of both total assets and market capitalization. The 
application of this criterion, which has led to an initial sample of 240 financial institutions, might, 
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however, introduce some survivorship bias in the selection process as it does not consider large 
financial institutions that have been delisted before 2006. Therefore, the initial sample has been 
complemented with the addition of any financial firm that was in the list of the top 300 financial 
institutions (in terms of total assets and market capitalization) in any year from 1992 to 2005. 
This has led to the selection of a further 122 financial institutions and to a total sample size of 
362 units.  
Next, as in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), we only retain in the sample financial 
institutions with sufficient data to estimate the measures of systemic importance over a period of 
five consecutive years - 54 sampling units were lost due to the application of this criterion. 
Finally, though the measures of systemic importance proposed in the literature focus on the tail 
of the distribution of stock returns, we exclude from the sample financial institutions suffering 
from thin trading – that is, they have less than 80% of non-zero returns over the sample period 
(see De Jonghe, 2010). This criterion reduces the sample size by five units. The sample of 
selected companies consists of 303 financial institutions. 
[Table 1] 
Table 1 reports the distribution of the final sample by country and sector. The sample is 
dominated by US financial institutions with a share of 26% of the total sample, followed by 
Japanese financial institutions (about 16% of the total sample). The distribution by sector shows 
that 65% of the sampling units are commercial banks, followed by insurance companies (22% of 
the sample). Overall the sample is equivalent to an average share of approximately 80% of total 
assets and market capitalization of the listed financial companies and is, therefore, very 
representative of the international financial system. 
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2.3 The Estimation of Benchmark Models: Measures of Realized Systemic 
Importance and Control Variables  
The assessment of the usefulness of market-based measures of systemic importance requires 
the preliminary estimation of benchmark models where proxies of the realized degree of systemic 
importance during a crisis event are explained by conventional risk-drivers. To this end, when 
the focus is on the global financial crisis, we employ as dependent variables four measures that 
aim to capture the realized systemic importance of financial institutions: i) the realized covariance 
risk; ii) the bailout of financial institutions via public funds; iii) the realized market value loss and 
iv) the realized capital shortfall. For the other two crisis episodes analyzed in this paper we 
replicate the prediction tests with the same set of dependent variables with the exclusion of ii) 
given the lack of a sufficient number of public rescues during these two crises. 
The selection of the above measures of realized systemic importance is justified by two key 
reasons. First, some of these measures have been employed in previous studies to assess the 
degree of systemic risk at the firm level associated with firm characteristics. Second, in the 
context of our analysis they offer the opportunity to assess the contribution of the market-based 
measures of systemic importance in terms of the predictability of the potential ex-post systemic 
damages that can be associated with insolvency at the firm level and in terms of the predictability 
of which institutions are more vulnerable under a systemic event and, consequently require ex-
ante interventions as highlighted in the introduction. 
In particular, the realized covariance risk and the bailout of financial institutions via public 
funds appear to be closer proxies for the potential systemic damages that can derive from 
distress conditions in financial institutions. Essentially, the failure of a bank with a higher 
covariance risk is supposed to affect the remaining banks more than the failure of a bank with a 
lower covariance risk and, hence, it is likely to generate negative spillover risk for other entities. 
Similarly, the regulatory decision to bailout financial institutions should reflect regulatory 
concerns over the systemic implications of the failure of a financial institution. It follows that 
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these first two proxies of the realized degree of systemic importance are expected to be related 
specially to those market-based measures (∆CoVaR and ∆A_CoVaR) that capture the risk-
spillover between a financial institution and the rest of the financial system. The other two 
measures of the degree of systemic importance during crises, the realized market value loss and 
the realized capital shortfall, are instead more likely to reflect the vulnerability of financial firms 
when a systemic shock materializes. Consequently, they are expected to be better explained by 
top-down market-based measures (SRISK and EXSHORT) where the causation runs from the 
system to the bank. 
We measure the realized covariance risk as the covariance between the daily returns of each 
financial institution and the daily returns of the value weighted portfolio of all institutions in the 
sample. A similar measure has been used by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) to quantify the 
degree of interdependency between a financial institution and the whole financial system to be 
used as an indicator of the impact of a financial institution on systemic risk during the financial 
crisis.  
Next, for the global financial crisis we construct a dummy variable (BAILOUT) that takes a 
value equal to one when a financial institution has been bailed out by means of public funds 
during the global crisis. The data on bailouts are collected on government-funded 
recapitalizations from ProPublica (http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list) for U.S. financial 
institutions, Petrovic and Tutsch (2009) for European financial institutions, and annual reports 
as well as company websites for the remainder of the sample. Furthermore, in the case of the 
US, we consider as bailed out institutions only those that received capital support outside the 
Capital Purchase Program (CPP), such as AIG, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, and/or institutions 
that were “forced” to receive public funds on October 14, 2008 in the context of this program. 
Financial institutions that instead took part in the CPP voluntarily have not been qualified as 
bailed out entities (for a detailed description of the program see Bayazitova and Shivdasani 
2012).v While the selection for the CPP was driven both by the banks’ voluntary decision to 
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submit an application and by the Treasury’s and direct banking regulators’ approval to participate 
in the program, Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) find clear evidence of self-selection by banks. 
Furthermore, CPP banks had stronger fundamentals compared to non-CPP banks both prior to 
and during the program’s initiation period (Ng, Vasvari, and Moerman 2011), and they had 
significantly stronger asset quality than banks that were not approved for CPP injections, 
suggesting that capital was not provided to banks with high levels of troubled assets (Bayazitova 
and Shivdasani 2012). These results are in line with the argument of the US Treasury that the 
CPP was not aimed at supporting poorly performing banks. Notably, after the applications of 
these criteria, out of the 245 institutions for which data are available to compute the pre-crisis 
market measures of systemic importance, 40 had been bailed out during the crisis. 
The third measure of realized systemic importance is taken from Acharya et al. (2010) and is 
computed as the buy and hold return (BHR) during the length of a crisis. Institutions that 
suffered from the largest decline in market valuation during the crisis are then identified as the 
most systemically important. Differently from Acharya et al. (2010) we employ in our regression 
analysis the value of BHR multiplied by minus one to ease the comparability with other proxies 
of realized systemic importance; namely, higher values denote a larger realized systemic importance 
during the crisis.  
The fourth measure of realized systemic risk contribution follows the logic behind the 
construction of SRISK where the contribution to systemic risk is related to the return that each 
institution realizes during a crisis event and to its leverage. Essentially we employ equation (2A) 
in the appendix to quantify the capital shortfall at the firm level during a crisis episode. More 
precisely, this capital shortfall is a function of the book value of liabilities before the eruption of 
a shock, the market value of equity and the decline in equity value suffered as a consequence of 
the systemic event (this decline in market value is expressed by the company BHR observed 
during the crisis period). 
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We estimate our benchmark models by regressing the measures of realized systemic 
importance on a set of explanatory variables that has been selected with the purpose of capturing 
conventional drivers of systemic risk while maintaining in the sample the largest number of 
financial institutions. We start our analysis by estimating a linear model where we include only 
financial institution size (SIZE) as an explanatory variable, measured via the log of total assets 
(in millions of US dollars). This first step of our analysis is motivated by the growing focus on 
size as a key driver of systemic importance in the aftermath of the global crisis (Laeven, 
Ratnovski, and Tong 2014, Viñals et al. 2013). The empirical evidence normally suggests that the 
larger financial institutions are more exposed to systemic shocks (De Jonghe 2010, Vallascas and 
Keasey 2012) and hence, a positive relationship is expected between SIZE and the measures of 
realized systemic importance.  
Next, we include in the regression analysis capital strength, volatility and basic indicators of 
the degree of interconnectedness in the global financial system. By estimating this second model 
we can, therefore, evaluate the additional contribution of additional firm characteristics in 
explaining the realized systemic importance during a crisis event. In section 3.3 we conduct 
additional tests to show that our results do not vary when we include other control variables. A 
financial institution’s capital strength (EQUITY) is measured by the ratio between total equity 
and total assets. The degree of systemic importance should be decreasing in EQUITY as under a 
systemic shock, highly leveraged financial institutions might be forced to de-leverage by 
liquidating assets at fire-sale prices in response to the increasing credit rationing by creditors 
facing liquidity constraints (Acharya and Viswanathan 2011, Shleifer and Vishny 2010). In line 
with this interpretation, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) find that higher leverage is generally 
associated with an increase in systemic importance as measured by ∆CoVaR and Benoit et al. 
(2013) find that the SRISK ranking of the top 10 US financial institutions resembles a leverage-
based ranking.  
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The next control variable is the volatility of daily stock returns computed for the year 2006 
(VOLATILITY) that captures financial institution total risk. More risky institutions are likely to 
be more prone to failure during systemic events and then exacerbate the effects of financial 
crises. Finally, we control for the degree of interconnectedness of a firm with the rest of the 
financial industry. The degree of interconnectedness is recognized as an important potential 
driver of systemic risk as it amplifies the externalities caused by financial distress via contagion 
risk.vi We employ the approach proposed by Billio et al. (2012) to derive measures of the degree 
of interconnectedness of a financial firm within the global financial system. Essentially we apply 
a Granger causality test on daily stock returns for a period of three years to estimate the number 
of financial institutions that a financial institution is ‘causing’ before the crisis event 
(CAUSING_OTHERS). For each pairs of stocks we estimate a linear specification with two 
lags of stock returns. We then interpret a larger number of CAUSING_OTHERS as indicating a 
higher degree of interconnectedness. As an additional control we also include the number of 
financial institutions causing the stock returns of a financial institution over the calendar year 
2006 (CAUSED_BY_OTHERS) that we estimate in a similar manner. 
While the described controls can be computed for all financial institutions in our sample, 
banks are characterized by some key distinguishing features. One, for instance, is the need to 
comply with the Basel capital requirements that offer the opportunity to compute different and 
probably more appropriate measures of capital strength compared to EQUITY. Furthermore, 
banks tend to combine different types of business lines by operating in interest-based (lending) 
and non-interest-based (commission, fee and trading) activities and from a systemic perspective, 
several theoretical studies argue that the development of diversified financial institutions may be 
detrimental to financial stability.  For instance, Wagner (2010) shows that while diversification 
may reduce the default risk of an individual institution, it may increase the risk of joint failures in 
the banking system by raising bank exposure to common sources of risks.  Similarly, Ibragimov, 
Jaffee, and Walden (2011) show that there is a threshold above which the individual benefits 
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related to diversification strategies are lower than the costs due to an increasing risk of joint bank 
failures in the banking system.  
Therefore, to control for the specificities of banks we estimate a bank-specific model that 
differs from the baseline specification in two aspects. First, we control for bank capital strength 
by means of the ratio between total regulatory capital and risk-weighted assets (REG_RATIO) 
as required by the Basel regulations. Second, we add into the regression model an index of 
revenue diversification (DIVERSIFICATION) that, following previous studies (see for 
instance Stiroh and Rumble 2006), is defined as one minus the Herfindhal index of income 
concentration between net interest-based activities and non-interest sources. Notably, the 
accounting information needed to construct these variables, especially those related to the 
regulatory capital ratio, are only available for a sufficient number of observations for the most 
recent years. We can, therefore, estimate this additional specification only for the test on the 
global financial crisis.  
We estimate benchmark prediction models of the realized systemic importance during the 
global crisis for the full sample and for the sub-sample of banks that is then extended with the 
inclusion of one of the market-based measures analyzed in this paper. All models are estimated 
via OLS with robust standard errors clustered at the country level to control for within country 
correlation in systemic importance. The only exception to this general framework refers to the 
prediction of BAILOUT; given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, we estimate a 
logit regression with robust standard errors clustered at the country level. 
[Table 2] 
In Table 2 we report definitions and summary statistics for the variables employed in our 
empirical tests including the four market-based measures of systemic importance computed 
before the eruption of each crisis episode. It is worth noting that EXSHORT is expressed in 
US$ mln and shows an extremely skewed distribution in all time periods. Consequently, the 
following empirical tests employ its log transformation rather than raw values. Finally, the 
 21 
summary statistics confirm that the Asian crisis had a much milder global reach than the 1998 
crisis. For instance, during the Asian crisis the financial institutions in our sample lost on average 
1.90% in market value compared to approximately 22.70% during the 1998 crisis, with an 
average covariance of 0.84 versus 3.52 in 1998. 
3 THE PREDICTIVE PERFORMANCE OF MARKET-BASED 
MEASURES OF SYSTEMIC IMPORTANCE DURING THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
This section presents tests on the prediction of measures of realized systemic importance 
during the global financial crisis. We start with the models that employ as dependent variables 
proxies of systemic importance that capture the risk of potential ex-post systemic damages in the 
case of a financial institution distress. Next, the analysis focuses on measures of vulnerability to 
systemic shocks. The last sub-section is devoted to additional tests to assess the robustness of 
our key findings.  
3.1 The Predictability of Covariance Risk and Bailouts during the Global Crisis 
Panel A of Table 3 reports the OLS estimates of the prediction model for the full sample where the 
dependent variable is the covariance risk during the global financial crisis. We start the analysis in 
columns (1) and (2) where we report two benchmark models that include, respectively, only size and size 
plus a set of additional conventional indicators of risk as explanatory variables. Next, we include 
alternative market-based measures of systemic importance as explanatory variables in an attempt to 
quantify their additional contribution to the regulatory and supervisory activity.  
The results of this analysis show that only ∆CoVaR offers an additional contribution in explaining 
the covariance risk during the global crisis. This market-based measure enters the model with a positive 
and significant coefficient indicating that a higher ∆CoVaR in 2006 was associated with a significantly 
higher covariance risk during the global financial crisis. Nevertheless, when compared to the model 
reported in column (2), we observe that the addition of ∆CoVaR as a predictor only increases the 
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explanatory power of the prediction model by about 3 percentage points (with the R-squared increasing 
from 45.3% to 48.5%).  
[Table 3] 
For the remaining market measures their information content is generally already captured by SIZE, 
VOLATILITY and CAUSING OTHERS that enter the specifications with the expected sign and with 
highly significant coefficients. It is worth, in particular, noting that the fact that CAUSING OTHERS is 
positive and significant suggests that the realized covariance risk during the global crisis reflects the 
potential spillover risk (and the related collateral damages) from a financial institution to the rest of the 
system. Furthermore, SIZE confirms its pivotal role during the recent global crisis - being able to capture 
about 50% of the total variance explained by the model in column (2). 
In Panel B, we repeat the analysis for the full sample of banks controlling for bank capital strength in 
terms of Basel requirements and for the degree of bank income diversification. The results are generally 
consistent with the findings for the full sample. The model confirms SIZE, VOLATILITY and 
CAUSING OTHERS as key determinants of realized covariance risk during the global crisis though it also 
suggests that an increase in this risk is produced by higher values of income diversification. More 
importantly, ∆CoVaR still enters the model with a positive and significant coefficient (at the 5% level), 
though the increase in the explanatory power of the model is, however, smaller (from 52.9% to 54.1%) 
compared to the full sample analysis. Furthermore, when the focus is only on banks, ∆A_CoVaR also 
appears to provide a (marginal) contribution to the prediction model.  
The additional information content of ∆CoVaR when the focus is on the prediction of realized 
measures of systemic importance that capture the potential systemic implications of bank failures is also 
confirmed by the regression results reported in Panel A of Table 4 where the dependent variable is 
BAILOUT. The models, estimated for the full sample according to a logit specification, with clustered 
standard errors at the country level, show that only ∆CoVaR enters the specification with a positive and 
significant coefficient (at the 10% level) indicating a higher probability of being bailed out for institutions 
having a higher pre-crisis ∆CoVaR.  
[Table 4] 
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The remaining market-based measures do not show any significant effect on the probability of being 
bailed out during the global crisis and the analysis suggests that the decision by regulators to rescue 
financial institutions is largely explained by size. This is clearly highlighted by the high pseudo R-squared 
of the model reported in the first column of Table 4 where SIZE is used as the only predictor of the 
probability of regulatory rescue and by the fact that size remains the only significant predictor in column 
(2). 
The conclusions remain similar when we limit the analysis to the sub-sample of banks: only CoVAR 
shows a significant coefficient (at the 5% level) in the prediction model, while none of the remaining 
market-based measures of systemic importance add any information to what it is already embedded in 
more conventional firm characteristics. Notably, when ∆CoVaR is added to the baseline specification we 
also observe a lower probability of receiving capital support by banks characterized by a higher regulatory 
capital ratio in 2006. 
[Table 5] 
To evaluate the importance of the additional information offered by ∆CoVaR under the logit 
specification that predicts the bailout of financial institutions, we compare the percentage of correctly 
classified institutions by the model in column (3) in Table 4, with the percentage of institutions correctly 
classified by the two benchmark models reported in columns (1) and (2). More precisely, Panel A of Table 
5 focuses on the full sample analysis and employs the value of the ratio between the number of bailout 
institutions (40) and the total number of observations (245) as a cut-off point to identify those institutions 
that have been correctly classified. In Panel B we repeat a similar analysis for the sub-sample of banks.  
Overall, the additional tests suggest that when the analysis is conducted for the full sample, the 
percentage of correctly classified bailed out institutions increases substantially when ∆CoVaR is added as 
an explanatory variable. In particular, moving from a model with only SIZE to a model with additional 
conventional controls increases the percentage of correctly classified institutions by only 2.5 percentage 
points (from 67.50% to 70%), while the inclusion of ∆CoVaR increases this percentage by a further 7.5 
percentage points. The improvement is, however, smaller when we focus on the total number of correctly 
classified institutions in column (2). Furthermore, we observe that ∆CoVaR appears less effective as an 
additional control when the analysis is limited to the sub-sample of banks. In this latter case, column (2) 
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in Panel B shows that while there is an improvement in terms of overall classification compared to the 
benchmark model based on SIZE of approximately 2.0 percentage points, the results in column (1) show 
that such an improvement is not observed in terms of the classification of the sub-set consisting only of 
the group of bailout institutions. 
In summary, the results of this section identify ∆CoVaR as the only market-based measure of systemic 
importance that provides additional information compared to what is already embedded in more 
conventional indicators of the potential degree of systemic relevance of a financial institution. 
Nevertheless, despite the degree of significance observed across all specifications, ∆CoVaR does not 
often add a particularly high explanatory power to our benchmark prediction models based on firm 
characteristics. The additional information content seems low especially when the analysis is conducted 
only on the sub-sample of banks. 
3.2 The Predictability of Buy and Hold Returns and Realized Capital Shortfall during 
the Global Crisis 
In this section we analyze the contribution of the four market-based measures of systemic 
importance in predicting proxies of the degree of vulnerability of financial institutions during the global 
crisis. As in the previous section we first estimate for the full sample a benchmark model with 
conventional explanatory variables that we then progressively extend with the addition of market-based 
measures of systemic importance. This empirical framework is extended to the sub-sample of banks with 
the addition of bank specific controls. 
[Table 6] 
Our first set of tests, reported in Panel A of Table 6, employ as the dependent variable the negative 
values of the buy and hold returns computed over the crisis period, with higher values denoting a larger 
vulnerability to the global crisis. Despite this variable, in theory, capturing the causation running from the 
system to banks in assessing systemic importance, from the results reported in Panel A we still observe 
that only ∆CoVaR enters the prediction model with a positive and significant coefficient (at the 5% level) 
with an increase in the explanatory power of the model (comparing columns (2) and (3)) of 2.2 percentage 
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points. Hence, a larger pre-crisis ∆CoVaR was associated with a larger decline in market valuation during 
the global crisis. 
While none of the other mark-based measures of systemic importance show a significant impact on 
the crisis performance of financial institutions, we find that conventional explanatory variables have a 
significant predictive ability. In particular, larger and more volatile financial institutions generally 
performed worse during the global crisis by suffering from a larger decline in market valuation. Once 
again, our results emphasize the importance of SIZE: as shown in the first column of Panel A of Table 6 
when we employ only the size of financial institutions as an explanatory variable in the prediction model 
we obtain a R-squared that is equal to 18.4%, equivalent to around 75% of the R-square of the model in 
column 3) that includes other firm characteristics and ∆CoVaR as additional controls. 
Panel B of Table 6 offers similar conclusion for the sub-sample of banks. In essence, we still observe 
that among the market-based measures of global systemic importance only ∆CoVaR predicts bank 
performance during the financial crisis contributing with an additional 3.4 percentage points to the 
explanatory power of the model (from 24.2% to 27.6%). We do not find that the two additional bank 
specific variables (the regulation ratio and the income diversification of a bank) help to predict (the 
negative value of) buy-and-hold returns during the crisis; rather these additional tests confirm the 
importance of size and volatility as significant predictors. Overall, it appears that the key findings are not 
affected by changes in the sample composition. 
The results are substantially different when we measure the degree of vulnerability of a financial 
institution in terms of capital shortfall suffered during the global financial crisis. Under this framework, 
the results reported in Panel A of Table 7 for the full sample support the view that especially SRISK and 
EXSHORT can provide early warning indications as to which institutions should be subject to more 
stringent ex-ante regulatory interventions as they are likely to be heavily affected by the eruption of a 
systemic shock through an erosion of their capital adequacy.  
[Table 7] 
More specifically, both SRISK and EXSHORT enter the regression model with a positive and 
significant coefficient and add, respectively, 23.2 and 6 percentage points to the explanatory power of the 
prediction model. Hence, it is in particular, SRISK that appears as an effective predictor and under this 
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setting it completely subsumes the importance of size in the prediction model. SIZE remains, however, 
largely significant in all other specifications and it is the only conventional variable that explains cross-
sectional variation in the value of the realized capital shortfall. It is also worth noting that both ∆CoVaR 
and ∆A_CoVaR add some, though marginal, contribution to the prediction model estimated under this 
empirical setting. In essence, SRISK and EXSHORT seem to work as early warning signals only under a 
specific setting, while ∆CoVaR shows a potential contribution to the activity of regulators and supervisors 
under a range of possible scenarios. 
Once again, the conclusions for the full sample are largely confirmed when the estimation is only 
conducted for the sub-sample of banks, the only exception being the lack of significance associated with 
∆A_CoVaR. Furthermore, bank diversification shows in some specifications a negative and significant 
coefficient denoting a lower capital shortfall in more diversified banking firms.  
Taken together the findings of this section, with the evidence shown by the previous tests, confirm 
that ∆CoVaR is the only metric of global systemic importance that enters all the estimated models with a 
significant coefficient and offers an improvement to the explanatory power of these models that is 
captured by more conventional firm characteristics. ∆CoVaR, therefore, offers early warning signals not 
only of the potential ex-post systemic damages that a financial institution distress can produce, as implied 
by its theoretical foundations, but also on the vulnerability of financial institutions when a systemic shock 
materializes. By contrast, the remaining market based measures show some ability to offer support to the 
regulatory and supervisory activity only under an empirical setting focusing on a specific definition of firm 
vulnerability. More precisely, SRISK and EXSHORT are effective as early warning devices only when the 
focus is on the realized capital shortfall - while in the remaining cases they appear to be characterized by a 
lack of additional information content especially with respect to financial institution size. 
3.3 Additional Tests 
We conduct several additional tests to evaluate whether our results are confirmed under 
alternative model specifications. First, we test whether our findings are influenced by the 
heterogeneity in accounting standards and in particular by the adoption of IFRS by numerous 
companies (103 financial institutions) in our sample. This adoption is supposed to have an 
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impact on the size of a company balance sheet, and consequently, on its leverage. This could 
affect the estimation of SRISK and EXSHORT as they are based on both market and 
accounting data. As mentioned in section 2.1, in adjusting the estimation of SRISK, we follow 
Acharya, Engle, and Pierret (2014) and Engle, Jondeau, and Rockinger (2014) and adopt a milder 
5.5% minimum capital requirement rather than 8% for all companies that at the end of 2006 
follow IFRS. Furthermore, as this adjustment implies that the values of total liabilities under 
IFRS are around 45% larger than under other accounting principles, we then re-estimate 
EXSHORT with an increase in the value of debt of 45% for IFRS companies. We then re-
estimate the prediction models by using these IFRS-adjusted measures rather than our initial 
measures of systemic importance. The above tests show that SRISK and EXSHORT do not 
improve their predictive performance after the IFRS adjustments. This is not surprising given 
that the IFRS-adjusted measures present a correlation well above 95% with the original measures 
of systemic importance. As a further test to control for heterogeneity in accounting standards, 
we repeat our analysis with the inclusion of a dummy variable equal to one if a financial 
institution has adopted IFRS and zero otherwise. Again, we do not find that SRISK and 
EXSHORT improve their predictive performance. 
Next, we estimate the models with additional control variables. We include a measure of 
funding composition defined by the ratio between short-term funding over total debts or a 
measure of maturity mismatch as defined in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). Both measures are 
only available for a sub-set of our sample (equal to 238 financial institutions). Furthermore, we 
control for the book-to-market ratio at the end of 2006, as Brunnermeier et al. (2012) show that 
this variable appears to be a significant determinant of systemic importance for a sample of US 
banks. Essentially, a higher book-to-market ratio is found to reduce the degree of systemic 
importance. These variables enter occasionally with a significant coefficient but this does not 
generally modify our key conclusion: we still continue to observe that ∆CoVaR performs 
generally better than the other market-based measures of systemic importance. In particular we 
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find that a higher value of the ratio between short-term funding and total liabilities significantly 
increases the probability to receive government support and increases the loss in market values 
suffered during the crisis. One consequence of the inclusion of these additional controls is the 
loss in the predictive power of ∆CoVaR of the bailouts of financial institutions but only when 
the analysis is conducted for the full sample. By contrast, in the case of banks, we still observe 
that a higher pre-crisis ∆CoVaR increases the probability to receive government support. 
Furthermore, for the sub-sample of banks we replace the regulatory capital ratio with a bank 
capital buffer: namely, the difference between the regulatory capital ratio and the minimum 
regulatory capital ratio imposed at the country level. This allows us to control more precisely for 
differences in capital regulation across countries. However, this control rarely enters any 
specification with a significant coefficient and, more importantly, does not influence the findings 
on the impact of the four market-based measures of systemic importance on our proxies of 
realized systemic importance during the global financial crisis. 
We then evaluate whether the aggregation of the four measures of systemic risk via principal 
component analysis is preferable to using a single indicator. Consequently, the derived systemic 
importance score, measured by the first principal component across the four measures, is 
employed as an explanatory variable in lieu of the single indicators. This analysis generally 
suggests that the aggregation does not deliver additional information compared to the use of a 
single measure of systemic importance: when a market based measure appears as a significant 
predictor of realized measures of systemic importance, its inclusion in the model is normally 
preferable to the inclusion of an aggregate score of systemic importance.   
Finally, we have used a year of data to construct our pre-crisis measures of systemic 
importance with the purpose of removing the influence of temporary factors which might raise 
the degree of systemic importance of a financial institution over a very short time period and 
offer misleading signals to regulators and supervisors. However, this choice is not without 
drawbacks. In particular, it might lead to reducing the predictive power of market-based 
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measures of systemic importance by ignoring the additional information content that could be 
associated with a sudden increase in the degree of systemic importance of a financial institution. 
Thus, we evaluate whether a shorter-time perspective in conducting our tests might contribute to 
increasing the information for regulators by using as predictors the average of each market-based 
measure computed during December 2006. In other words, we repeat the analysis by ignoring 
the information that these measures offer in the first eleven months of 2006 under the 
assumption that the most recent values incorporate newer information on the degree of systemic 
importance. Nevertheless, the re-estimation of the prediction models under this new empirical 
setting does not show any improvement in the prediction performance of market-based measure 
of systemic importance. 
4 THE PREDICTIVE PERFORMANCE OF MARKET-BASED 
MEASURES OF SYSTEMIC IMPORTANCE IN OTHER CRISIS 
EPISODES 
In this section we focus on the predictive performance of the four market-based measures of 
systemic importance in two other crisis episodes: the Asian Crisis in the second half of 1997 and 
the Russian default and the related rescue of LTCM in 1998. More precisely, we focus on the 
predictability of three out of four measures of realized systemic importance that we have 
examined for the global financial crisis: covariance risk, the (negative value of) buy and hold 
return, and a proxy of the realized capital shortfall. Furthermore, similarly as in the previous tests 
we start by estimating benchmark models based on firm characteristics observed at the end of 
1996 for the Asian crisis and at the end of 1997 for the 1998 crisis and then we add one of the 
market-based measures as an additional predictor. 
[Table 8] 
Table 8 reports the prediction tests of covariance risk with Panel A that focuses on the Asian 
crisis and Panel B on the results for the 1998 crisis. The results for the Asian Crisis suggest that 
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∆CoVaR does not confirm its predictive ability observed during the global financial crisis while 
several firm characteristics predict the realized covariance risk in the second half of 1997. 
Nevertheless, the size factor seems to play a much lower role than in the recent crisis. Overall, 
some additional explanatory power comes only from SRISK - when added to the firm 
characteristics variables it increases the R-squared by approximately 2.5 percentage points. Even 
more disappointing is the predictive performance of the market measures of systemic 
importance when the analysis is conducted on the 1998 crisis: none of the market measures enter 
the model with a significant coefficient. It is worth noting, however, that in this prediction test, 
conventional firm characteristics also perform particularly poorly with the exception of 
CAUSING OTHERS; this variable shows an ability to predict covariance risk in all three of the 
crisis episodes we have analyzed in this study.  
[Table 9] 
Table 9 reports the regression results when the negative value of the buy-and-hold returns is 
the dependent variable in the prediction model. Only for the Asian crisis does the analysis offer a 
picture that shows some similarity with the global crisis: ∆CoVaR appears to be the market-
measure that offers the best additional information content compared to more conventional 
drivers of systemic importance, followed by ∆A_CoVaR.  Nevertheless, under the 1998 crisis 
none of the four measures enters the prediction model with the expected sign and with a 
significant coefficient. By contrast ∆CoVaR offers misleading indications to regulators and 
supervisors: a higher ∆CoVaR in 1997 is associated with better performance (a lower decline in 
value) during the 1998 crisis. Interestingly, during the 1998 crisis where the loss in value suffered 
by financial institutions is on average 12 times larger than during the Asian crisis (22.70% versus 
1.90%), size emerges as significant predictor of the buy-and-hold returns. Overall, the results 
appear substantially different across the two crisis episodes and, more importantly, often not 
fully aligned with the evidence obtained in the previous section for the global financial crisis. 
[Table 10] 
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Finally, more similarities with the recent financial crisis emerge when we employ the realized 
capital shortfall as our dependent variable in the prediction test. The results reported in Panel A 
of Table 10 suggest that the two top-down measures (SRISK and EXSHORT), that are 
supposed to capture vulnerability conditions under systemic events, significantly predict the 
realized capital shortfall during the Asian crisis, with SRISK providing the highest additional 
explanatory power to the prediction model. We achieve a similar conclusion in Panel B when the 
prediction test is conducted for the 1998 crisis. However, in such a context the others two 
market measures of systemic importance exhibit some additional predictive power. Overall, 
SRISK and EXSHORT appear to have only a specific use for regulators and supervisors - that is, 
when the need is to assess the vulnerability of the capital adequacy of financial institutions to 
systemic shocks and the related design of ex-ante interventions in terms of capital requirements. 
In summary, this section suggests that outside the global crisis ∆CoVaR does not confirm its 
ability to consistently predict all the different notions of realized systemic importance employed in 
our prediction tests. More importantly, it does not perform particularly well even when the 
measure of realized systemic importance should reflect the potential for ex-post damages 
stemming from individual distress conditions and is thus closer to the theoretical design of 
∆CoVaR. More generally, all the market-based measures perform very poorly in predicting 
covariance risk and the loss in market value when the tests are based on a severe crisis event 
such as the 1998 crisis where on average the financial institutions in our sample lost 22% in 
market valuation. Some predictive power emerges occasionally under the Asian crisis, a clearly 
milder crisis event from a global perspective. Furthermore, a consistent picture across different 
tests emerges only when the definition of vulnerability of financial institutions to systemic shocks 
is based on capital shortfall.  
All in all, the identification of the crisis episode is crucial in influencing the predictive 
performance of the market-based measure of systemic importance. This highlights the 
difficulties in identifying a measure of systemic importance that remains a valid regulatory and 
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supervisory tool over time. It is interesting to note that this finding is also in line with the 
evidence reported by Rose and Speigel (2011) of the weak predictive ability of key macro drivers 
of the global financial crisis when applied to other periods of turmoil.   
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Numerous market based measures that attempt to quantify the degree of systemic importance 
of financial institutions have been proposed in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The 
purpose of these measures is to offer regulators and supervisors additional, and more effective, 
tools to monitor systemic risk at the firm level. From a theoretical perspective, some of these 
measures focus on the implications of a financial institution’s distress on the rest of the financial 
system and are consequently designed to be useful to control ex-post systemic damages from 
individual distress conditions. Others emphasize the degree of vulnerability of a financial 
institution in the case of a systemic shock and are then supposed to be useful when the purpose 
of supervisors is to design ex-ante interventions that reduce the potential number of defaults 
when a crisis materializes.  
To be beneficial for regulators and supervisors, however, both types of measures have to 
offer information that is not already incorporated in more conventional risk proxies; namely, 
they have to signal something not already known on the basis of conventional drivers of 
systemic risk at the firm level. This paper shows that this requirement is not fully satisfied by a 
number of the most recent market-based measures of systemic importance and often questions 
the additional contribution that these measures provide with respect to simpler indicators of 
systemic importance. This conclusion emerges from a comprehensive comparison, conducted 
across three different financial crises (the global financial crisis, the Asian crisis and the 1998 
crisis related to the Russian default and to the rescue of LTCM), of two measures that are 
expected to be beneficial in controlling ex-post systemic damages (∆CoVaR and asymmetric 
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∆CoVaR) from the distress of financial institutions and two measures that are instead more likely 
to be useful in signaling the need for ex-ante supervisory interventions (SRISK and EXSHORT).  
More precisely, the tests that employ the global financial crisis as a laboratory identify 
∆CoVaR as the only market-based measure that is able to significantly explain the different 
notions of realized systemic importance computed over this crisis event. ∆CoVaR, therefore, 
offers early warning signals not just in terms of potential ex-post systemic damages that can arise 
from financial institution distress but also in terms of the vulnerability of these institutions to the 
occurrence of a systemic shock. Nevertheless, in terms of magnitude, the contribution of this 
measure compared to more conventional firm characteristics, and in particular to firm size, 
remains rather small.  
During the global financial crisis, however, more disappointing is the performance of the 
other three market-based measures of systemic importance. The asymmetric version of ∆CoVaR 
only very seldom offers some additional predictive power to the early warning models, while 
SRISK and EXSHORT show some significant predictive ability only when the focus is on a 
specific definition of vulnerability; that is, the vulnerability of financial institutions in terms of 
capital shortfall. By contrast, they do no show any predictive power when the vulnerability is 
based simply on the decline in market value suffered during the crisis. 
The overall picture becomes even more complex when the analysis focuses on the Asian crisis 
and the 1998 crisis. In these additional tests, ∆CoVaR does not confirm its ability to consistently 
predict different notions of systemic importance, suggesting that some of its predictive power 
during the global crisis is due to the specificities of this crisis. Furthermore, all measures perform 
especially poorly in two out of three tests conducted on the 1998 crisis; namely, they do not offer 
particular support to regulators and supervisors especially in the crisis event that appears closer 
to the recent crisis in terms of negative impact on the financial institutions included in our 
sample.  
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All in all, if we put together the results of the three crisis tests we conclude that some degree 
of consistency only emerges when the focus is on the predictability of the vulnerability of 
financial institutions narrowly defined in terms of capital adequacy. In this respect, SRISK and, 
to a minor extent, EXSHORT seem to offer a valuable support to design ex-ante supervisory 
interventions on firm-specific capital requirements. 
In conclusion, the key message from our tests is that it is problematic to identify a market-
based measure of systemic importance that remains valid across financial crises with different 
features and across different measures of realized systemic importance. It is worth noting, 
however, that our analysis shows that this criticism also applies to more conventional proxies 
employed by regulators to identify the most systemically important financial institutions. In this 
respect, size seems the most consistent indicator among the conventional measures - especially 
under severe global systemic events such as the recent global crisis and the 1998 crisis. 
 35 
APPENDIX: ESTIMATION OF GLOBAL SYSTEMIC IMPORTANCE 
In this section we provide details on the estimation procedures of the four market-based 
measures of systemic importance. Each measure is estimated on a daily frequency. In each 
prediction test, we construct the four measures on the basis of 5 years of data and we then 
employ the average computed over the last calendar year before the year of the eruption of the 
crisis in our prediction test. 
∆CoVaR and ∆A_CoVaR - the two bottom-up CoVaR approaches share some key 
characteristics. In particular, CoVaR denotes the Value at Risk of the financial system conditional 
on the performance of an institution i. Furthermore the performance on institution i is expressed 
as the Value at Risk computed on tX  that normally refers to equity returns or asset returns. This 
implies that the
 iXCSystem
t,qCoVaR  is defined by the q-quantile of the conditional probability 
distribution: 
    'titXCSystemqSystemt qXCCoVaRXPr
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It follows that the degree of systemic importance of an institution i is obtained by subtracting 
the CoVaR of the system when i is in “normal” conditions, expressed by a value of tX  equal to 
the median, from the value of the CoVaR when a distress condition in i is observed: 
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As in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) 
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estimated via quantile regression where tX  is regressed on a vector of lagged ‘state variables’ 
1tM   describing the economic environment: 
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Given the purpose of the empirical tests discussed in this paper, the state variables in Adrian 
and Brunnermeier (2011) have been modified with the aim of describing the ‘global’ economic 
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environment.  In particular, the global stock market conditions are described by the return of a 
World Market Index from Datastream and by the volatility of this index (estimated by the GJR-
GARCH model). The performance of the global real estate sector is measured by the annual 
cumulative return of a World Real Estate Index from Datastream. The change in the risk free 
rate is the GDP weighted average of the 3 month government yield rate for the G7 countries 
(US, UK, Germany, Canada, France, Italy and Japan), while the default risk is the GDP weighted 
average of the difference between the 3-month interbank rate and the 3 month government yield 
rate. The change in the global yield is the G7 GDP weighted average of the difference between 
the ten-year and the 3-month government yield rate. Finally, the proxy for the global liquidity 
risk is the change in the GDP weighted average difference between the 2-month and 1 –month 
interbank rates for the G7 countries. 
The quantification of the degree of systemic importance is then derived employing the 
predicted values from (11), expressed as follows: 
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The major difference between the original CoVaR and the asymmetric approach (A_CoVaR) 
proposed by Lopez-Espinosa et al. (2012) refers to the underlying assumption that is used to 
model the relationship between the VaR of the financial system and the returns of an institution 
i. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) assume that the VaR of the financial system is affected in the 
same way by positive and negative returns realized by an institution i while Lopez-Espinosa et al. 
(2012) assume that the VaR of the financial system is more sensitive to negative returns realized 
by firm i than to positive returns. Therefore, the quantile regression for systemtX has been modified 
as reported below: 
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SRISK - Brownlees and Engle (2012), building upon Acharya et al. (2010), measure the 
degree of systemic importance of a financial institution via its participation in the systemic capital 
shortfall during a crisis. More specifically, for firm i at time t, under a prudential equity to asset 
ratio equal to k, the capital buffer is equal to: 
  tititi WTAkBuffer Capital ,,,        (A5) 
where TA is equivalent to the sum of risky debts (RD), guaranteed debts (GD) and the 
amount of equity capital tiW , . The expected capital shortfall (CS) in period t+1 under a crisis 
event, defined as a drop in the market return below a certain threshold C, is then measured as 
follows: 
 
    CrisisWTAkECS tititi 1,,1,     (A6) 
         = E1 k RDi,t +GD i,t+Wi,t+1( )-Wi,t+1 Crisiséë ùû                 (A6.1) 
               CRREWkGDRDk tmtitititi   1,1,1,,, 11   (A6.2) 
where 1t,iR   and 1t,mR  are the firm and market (arithmetic) returns in period t+1. 
 CRRE 1t,m1t,i1   is the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES); namely, the tail expectation of the 
firm return conditional on the market being in its left tail. To model MES, as in Brownlees and 
Engle (2012), the firm and market returns (measured as the value weighted average return of the 
financial institutions in the sample) are described as follow: 
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where tm, and ti ,  are the volatility for the market and firm i at date t, ti , is the correlation 
between the returns of market and firm i at date t, and tm, and ti , are residuals following 
independent and identical normal distributions with zero mean, unit variance and zero 
covariance. Therefore, MES can be decomposed as follows:  
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Following Brownlees and Engle (2012) the estimates of t,m and t,i  are based on the GJR-
GARCH model while t,i is derived from a Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model.  
Finally, the tail expectation  1tm,1t,m1t,m1 /CE     and  1tm,1t,m1t,i1 /CE     have been 
estimated with a nonparametric kernel estimation approach. The first 1000 observations are 
required to estimate the tail behavior to draw the first estimates for MES.  
Finally, as formalized below, the degree of systemic importance of a financial institution is 
defined as the portion of the total expected system capital shortfall which a firm i participates in 
during a crisis: 
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EXSHORT – a top-down framework is also characterized in the measure proposed by Lehar 
(2005). The author defines the degree of systemic importance of a financial institution in terms 
of the share of the total volatility of the expected shortfall for the system that expresses the risk 
exposure of a hypothetical regulator. More specifically, the expected shortfall for the system is 
defined as the total present value of the amount of debt that cannot be covered by the assets of 
the financial institution in the case of default. Under the Merton (1977) framework, for a bank i 
this is equivalent to the value of a put option expressed by the following equation: 
   tittitit dNVtdNBS          (A10) 
Where itB  is the book value of total debts,   is the value of asset volatility, 
i
tV  is the market 
value of total assets and td  is equal to
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The volatility of the expected shortfall for the banking system, that is the sum of itS  across all 
the banks in the system, is then computed through the variance-covariance matrix    of the 
returns on the bank’s asset portfolios, whose components are based on an exponentially 
weighted moving average (EWMA) model with a decay factor ( ) equal to 0.94, and using the 
vectors t  of partial derivatives  tiitti V/SV  .  
Then, using first order terms, the Dollar-volatility of the expected shortfall tz  can be 
approximated as follows:
 
'
ttttz            (A11) 
Lehar (2005) decomposes tz  on the basis of the standard concept of component value at risk 
where the vector of contributions to the expected shortfall risk is measured by means of the 
following equation: 
  't'tt
t
t *
z
1
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Where * is the element wise-product of two vectors and the total sum of the elements of t , 
that quantify the degree of systemic importance at the firm level, is equal to tz . 
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TABLES 
TABLE 1: SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION BY COUNTRY AND SECTOR 
. 
Full sample Commercial 
banks 
Insurance  
companies 
Financial services 
companies 
 N % N % N % N % 
Australia 8 2.64 6 3.05 0 0.00 2 5.26 
Austria 1 0.33 1 0.51 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Belgium  4 1.32 3 1.52 1 1.47 0 0.00 
Brazil  1 0.33 1 0.51 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Canada 11 3.63 6 3.05 5 7.35 0 0.00 
China 3 0.99 3 1.52 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Denmark 3 0.99 3 1.52 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Finland 2 0.66 1 0.51 1 1.47 0 0.00 
France 11 3.63 6 3.05 4 5.88 1 2.63 
Germany 15 4.95 6 3.05 7 10.29 2 5.26 
Greece 4 1.32 4 2.03 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Hong Kong 3 0.99 3 1.52 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Hungary 1 0.33 1 0.51 0 0.00 0 0.00 
India 2 0.66 2 1.02 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Ireland 3 0.99 2 1.02 1 1.47 0 0.00 
Israel 2 0.66 2 1.02 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Italy 16 5.28 12 6.09 4 5.88 0 0.00 
Japan 45 14.85 29 14.72 5 7.35 11 28.95 
Luxembourg 2 0.66 2 1.02 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Malaysia  3 0.99 3 1.52 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Mexico 1 0.33 1 0.51 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Netherlands 3 0.99 1 0.51 2 2.94 0 0.00 
Norway 3 0.99 3 1.52 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Portugal 5 1.65 5 2.54 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Russia 1 0.33 1 0.51 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Singapore 3 0.99 3 1.52 0 0.00 0 0.00 
South Africa 8 2.64 4 2.03 3 4.41 1 2.63 
South Korea 8 2.64 7 3.55 0 0.00 1 2.63 
Spain  6 1.98 6 3.05 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Sweden 5 1.65 4 2.03 1 1.47 0 0.00 
Switzerland 6 1.98 2 1.02 4 5.88 0 0.00 
Taiwan 6 1.98 4 2.03 2 2.94 0 0.00 
Thailand  4 1.32 4 2.03 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Turkey 4 1.32 3 1.52 0 0.00 1 2.63 
United Kingdom  17 5.61 10 5.08 5 7.35 2 5.26 
USA 83 27.39 43 21.83 23 33.82 17 44.74 
Total  
303 100.00 197 100.00 68 100.00 38 100.00 
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TABLE 2: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
  N Mean Median St.Dev. P1 P99 
Panel A: Variables employed for the tests on the Global Financial Crisis       
∆CoVaR Market measure of systemic importance based on 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) 
245 0.52 0.54 0.29 -0.03 1.12 
∆A_CoVaR Market measure of systemic importance based on 
Lopez-Espinosa et al., (2012) 
245 0.84 0.82 0.47 -0.08 1.90 
SRISK Market measure of systemic importance based on 
Brownlees and Engle (2012) 
245 0.40 0.13 0.71 0.00 3.59 
EXSHORT Market measure of systemic importance based on 
Lehar (2005): US$ mln 
245 4542.44 73.57 16663.61 -214.49 98955.86 
LN(EXSHORT) Log of Market measure of systemic importance based 
on Lehar (2005) 
245 7.41 6.90 1.19 6.56 11.51 
COVARIANCE Covariance between daily stock returns of financial 
institution i with the return of the value weighted 
remaining financial institutions in the sample 2nd July 
2007 to 31 st December 2008 
245 4.73 4.55 2.52 0.13 11.06 
BAILOUT  Dummy Equal to one if a financial institution has 
received capital support via public funds 
245 0.16 0.00 0.37 0.00 1.00 
NBHR  Minus the buy and hold returns computed from 2nd 
July 2007 to 31 st December 2008 (%) 
245 49.64 52.00 28.59 -26.16 97.76 
CAP_SHORTFALL Realized capital shortfall 2nd July 2007 to 31st 
December 2008. Based on Brownlees and Engle 
(2012) (%) 
241 0.41 0.06 0.91 0.00 4.49 
SIZE  Log of Total assets measured in millions of US $  245 11.77 11.54 1.18 9.55 14.46 
EQUITY  Equity over total assets (%)  245 7.78 6.55 5.38 1.43 28.49 
VOLATILITY Equity returns volatility (%) 245 25.20 23.80 9.39 10.99 53.74 
CAUSING OTHERS Number of financial institutions caused by financial 
institution i based on linear Granger causality tests 
on daily stock returns with two lags.  
245 73.71 68.00 50.16 4.00 182.00 
CAUSED BY OTHERS Number of financial institutions that are causing 
financial institution i based on linear Granger 
causality tests on daily stock returns with two lags. 
245 70.84 55.00 52.70 4.00 177.00 
REG_RATIO Regulatory capital divided by risk-weighted assets 155 12.24 11.80 2.62 8.79 25.00 
DIVERSIFICATION 1 minus the Herfindhal index of income 
concentration between interest and non-interest 
income 155 0.43 0.46 0.09 0.14 0.50 
Panel B: Variables employed for the tests on the Asian Financial Crisis       
∆CoVaR Market measure of systemic importance based on 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) 
219 0.641 0.609 0.348 -0.182 1.343 
∆A_CoVaR Market measure of systemic importance based on 
Lopez-Espinosa et al., (2012) 
219 1.210 1.247 0.756 -0.345 2.918 
SRISK Market measure of systemic importance based on 
Brownlees and Engle (2012) 
219 0.46 0.21 0.73 0.00 3.94 
EXSHORT Market measure of systemic importance based on 
Lehar (2005): US$ mln 
219 
1512.40 87.50 3995.36 0.00 19522.43 
LN(EXSHORT) Log of Market measure of systemic importance based 
on Lehar (2005) 
219 4.52 4.49 2.74 0.70 9.88 
COVARIANCE Covariance between daily stock returns of financial 
institution i with the return of the value weighted 
remaining financial institutions in the sample from 2nd  
July 1997 to 12th November 1997 
219 0.84 0.84 0.39 -0.08 1.79 
NBHR  Minus the buy and hold returns computed from 2nd 
July 1997 to 12th November 1997 (%) 
219 1.90 -1.79 26.21 -61.42 62.67 
CAP_SHORTFALL Realized capital shortfall from 2nd July 1997 to 12th 
November 1997. Based on Brownlees and Engle 
(2012) (%) 
219 0.46 0.00 1.16 0.00 5.63 
SIZE  Log of Total assets measured in millions of US $  219 10.68 10.64 1.08 8.19 13.12 
EQUITY  Equity over total assets (%)  219 7.59 6.34 5.71 1.76 31.06 
VOLATILITY Equity returns volatility (%) 219 1.44 1.37 0.42 0.78 3.08 
CAUSING OTHERS Number of financial institutions caused by financial 
institution i based on linear Granger causality tests 
on daily stock returns with two lags.  
219 36.02 26.00 28.26 7.00 121.00 
CAUSED BY OTHERS Number of financial institutions that are causing 
financial institution i based on linear Granger 
causality tests on daily stock returns with two lags. 
219 36.02 31.00 20.03 9.00 97.00 
Notes: Panels A, B and C of this Table report the variable definitions and the summary statistics of the market measures of 
systemic importance, the measures of realized systemic importance and the control variables, employed for, respectively, the 
Global Financial Crisis Tests, the Asian Crisis Tests and the 1998 Crisis Tests. 
 47 
Table 2: CONTINUED 
Panel C: Variables employed for the tests on the 1998 Financial Crisis       
∆CoVaR Market measure of systemic importance based on 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) 
219 0.61 0.56 0.35 -0.21 1.49 
∆A_CoVaR Market measure of systemic importance based on 
Lopez-Espinosa et al., (2012) 
219 1.10 1.07 0.68 -0.30 2.71 
SRISK Market measure of systemic importance based on 
Brownlees and Engle (2012) 
219 0.37 0.02 0.93 0.00 4.65 
EXSHORT Market measure of systemic importance based on 
Lehar (2005): US$ mln 
219 4541.68 171.78 27096.20 -57.41 133854.
20 
LN(EXSHORT) Log of Market measure of systemic importance based 
on Lehar (2005) 
219 6.59 6.13 1.37 5.45 11.81 
COVARIANCE Covariance between daily stock returns of financial 
institution i with the return of the value weighted 
remaining financial institutions in the sample from 3rd  
August 1998 to 5th October 1998 
219 3.52 3.76 2.09 -0.85 7.93 
NBHR  Minus the buy and hold returns computed from 3rd 
August 1998 to 5th October 1998 (%) 
219 22.70 23.17 18.16 -28.29 56.13 
CAP_SHORTFALL Realized capital shortfall from 3rd August 1998 to 5th 
October 1998. Based on Brownlees and Engle (2012) 
(%) 
219 0.46 0.00 1.19 0.00 5.83 
SIZE  Log of Total assets measured in millions of US $  219 10.70 10.56 1.09 8.26 13.06 
EQUITY  Equity over total assets (%)  
219 8.04 6.30 7.56 2.23 29.19 
VOLATILITY Equity returns volatility (%) 
219 2.17 1.86 0.95 1.05 5.47 
CAUSING OTHERS Number of financial institutions caused by financial 
institution i based on linear Granger causality tests on 
daily stock returns with two lags.  
219 48.37 34.00 38.26 8.00 149.00 
CAUSED BY OTHERS Number of financial institutions that are causing 
financial institution i based on linear Granger causality 
tests on daily stock returns with two lags. 
219 49.02 46.00 24.77 9.00 100.00 
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TABLE 3: REALIZED COVARIANCE RISK DURING THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND 
MARKET MEASURES OF GLOBAL SYSTEMIC IMPORTANCE BEFORE THE CRISIS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Full sample       
SIZE 1.010*** 0.879*** 0.707*** 0.853*** 1.049*** 0.963*** 
 (6.98) (8.62) (8.15) (8.22) (9.50) (12.28) 
EQUITY  0.040 0.041 0.035 0.039 0.038 
  (1.16) (1.38) (1.02) (1.05) (1.01) 
VOLATILITY  0.040* 0.038* 0.040* 0.043** 0.043* 
  (1.96) (2.03) (1.99) (2.21) (1.93) 
CAUSING OTHERS  0.024*** 0.015*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 
  (5.69) (4.80) (6.57) (5.49) (6.08) 
CAUSED BY OTHERS  -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
  (0.31) (0.23) (0.14) (0.24) (0.46) 
∆CoVaR   2.450***    
   (3.60)    
∆A_CoVaR    0.495   
    (1.30)   
SRISK     -0.365  
     (1.30)  
Ln (EXSHORT)      -0.143 
      (0.80) 
Constant -7.166*** -8.496*** -7.160*** -8.462*** -10.441*** -8.417*** 
 (3.66) (5.46) (5.64) (5.75) (9.58) (4.95) 
Observations 245 245 245 245 245 245 
R-squared 0.224 0.453 0.485 0.457 0.458 0.456 
Panel B: Banks       
SIZE 0.904*** 0.778*** 0.842*** 1.084*** 1.077*** 0.904*** 
 (8.13) (6.71) (7.26) (8.17) (10.04) (8.13) 
REG_RATIO 0.054 0.030 0.041 0.056 0.043 0.054 
 (1.33) (0.76) (1.01) (1.34) (0.97) (1.33) 
DIVERSIFICATION 4.129*** 3.376** 4.299*** 3.754** 3.210* 4.129*** 
 (2.89) (2.39) (3.10) (2.24) (1.72) (2.89) 
VOLATILITY 0.062*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.064*** 0.070*** 0.062*** 
 (3.73) (3.54) (3.83) (3.90) (4.03) (3.73) 
CAUSING OTHERS 0.024*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 (7.55) (6.15) (7.55) (7.06) (7.30) (7.55) 
CAUSED BY OTHERS -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (1.21) (1.16) (1.18) (1.12) (1.26) (1.21) 
∆CoVaR  1.505**     
  (2.04)     
∆A_CoVaR   0.751*    
   (1.94)    
SRISK    -0.331   
    (1.26)   
Ln (EXSHORT)     -0.261  
     (1.32)  
Constant -11.181*** -9.477*** -10.721*** -13.113*** -10.912*** -11.181*** 
 (5.47) (4.78) (5.54) (6.80) (4.55) (5.47) 
Observations 155 155 155 155 155 155 
R-squared 0.529 0.541 0.539 0.533 0.536 0.529 
 
Notes: This Table reports the regression results of the relationship between the covariance risk during the global financial crisis 
(July 2007-December 2008) and the degree of systemic importance in 2006 according to market measures. SIZE is defined as the 
log transformation of firm total assets at the end of 2006, EQUITY is the ratio between equity capital and total assets, 
VOLATILITY is the stock return volatility computed with daily stock returns, CAUSING OTHERS is the number of 
financial institutions that a financial institution A is causing during year 2006 according to Granger causality tests based on daily 
stock returns, CAUSED BY OTHERS is the number of financial institutions that are a financial institution A during year 2006 
according to Granger causality tests based on daily stock returns, REG_RATIO is regulatory capital divided by risk-weighted 
assets, and DIVERSIFICATION is 1 minus the Herfindahl index of income concentration between interest and non-interest 
income. Robust t statistics clustered at the country level are reported in round brackets and *** (**;*) indicates  significant at 
1%(5%;10%).
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TABLE 4: BAILOUTS DURING THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND MARKET 
MEASURES OF GLOBAL SYSTEMIC IMPORTANCE BEFORE THE CRISIS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Full sample       
SIZE 1.155*** 0.998*** 0.800* 0.948** 1.425*** 1.101*** 
 (3.69) (2.87) (1.74) (2.39) (2.63) (2.78) 
EQUITY  -0.100 -0.120 -0.114 -0.120 -0.119 
  (1.19) (1.19) (1.17) (1.35) (1.34) 
VOLATILITY  0.016 0.016 0.015 0.021 0.021 
  (0.56) (0.59) (0.52) (0.73) (0.74) 
CAUSING OTHERS  0.002 -0.006 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.41) (0.75) (0.09) (0.27) (0.27) 
CAUSED BY OTHERS  -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.008 -0.010 
  (1.23) (1.18) (1.07) (1.00) (1.27) 
∆CoVaR   2.763*    
   (1.69)    
∆A_CoVaR    0.704   
    (0.79)   
SRISK     -0.621  
     (1.52)  
Ln (EXSHORT)      -0.138 
      (0.84) 
Constant -15.789*** -13.172*** -11.636* -12.943** -18.131** -13.304*** 
 (3.94) (2.60) (1.93) (2.39) (2.53) (2.59) 
Observations 245 245 245 245 245 245 
Pseudo R-squared 0.249 0.283 0.313 0.289 0.295 0.286 
Panel B: Banks       
SIZE 1.008*** 1.051*** 0.742* 1.007*** 1.645*** 1.145** 
 (3.31) (3.25) (1.75) (2.83) (2.60) (2.49) 
REG_RATIO  -0.190 -0.287* -0.204 -0.171 -0.200 
  (1.34) (1.71) (1.31) (1.30) (1.36) 
DIVERSIFICATION  -0.092 -2.959 0.014 -1.175 -0.525 
  (0.03) (0.67) (0.00) (0.32) (0.15) 
VOLATILITY  0.038 0.036 0.038 0.044 0.043 
  (1.04) (0.83) (1.02) (1.22) (1.06) 
CAUSING OTHERS  0.002 -0.014 -0.001 0.002 0.002 
  (0.37) (1.35) (0.18) (0.33) (0.32) 
CAUSED BY OTHERS  -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 -0.007 
  (0.78) (0.73) (0.73) (0.53) (0.80) 
∆CoVaR   4.560**    
   (2.31)    
∆A_CoVaR    0.651   
    (0.72)   
SRISK     -0.800  
     (1.63)  
Ln (EXSHORT)      -0.110 
      (0.45) 
Constant -13.689*** -12.543** -7.956 -12.273** -19.398*** -12.649** 
 (3.45) (2.48) (1.16) (2.25) (2.61) (2.47) 
Observations 155 155 155 155 155 155 
Pseudo R-squared 0.218 0.249 0.329 0.255 0.274 0.250 
Notes: This Table reports the regression results of the relationship between bailouts during the global financial crisis and the 
degree of systemic importance in 2006 according to market measures. SIZE is defined as the log transformation of firm total 
assets at the end of 2006, EQUITY is the ratio between equity capital and total assets, VOLATILITY is the stock return 
volatility computed with daily stock returns, CAUSING OTHERS is the number of financial institutions that a financial 
institution A is causing during year 2006 according to Granger causality tests based on daily stock returns, CAUSED BY 
OTHERS is the number of financial institutions that are a financial institution A during year 2006 according to Granger 
causality tests based on daily stock returns, REG_RATIO is regulatory capital divided by risk-weighted assets, and 
DIVERSIFICATION is 1 minus the Herfindahl index of income concentration between interest and non-interest income. 
Robust t statistics clustered at the country level are reported in round brackets and *** (**;*) indicates  significant at 
1%(5%;10%). 
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TABLE 5: CLASSIFICATION STATISTICS FROM THE LOGIT PREDICTION MODELS 
 (1) (2) 
 % Bailout institutions  
correctly classified 
% All institutions  
correctly classified 
Panel A: Full sample   
Only SIZE 67.50 74.29 
   
SIZE + additional conventional variables 70.00 74.29 
   
SIZE + additional conventional variables +CoVAR 77.50 78.37 
   
Panel B: Banks   
Only SIZE 76.67 76.13 
   
SIZE + additional conventional variables 73.33 76.77 
   
SIZE + additional conventional variables +CoVAR 76.67 78.71 
   
   
Notes: This Table reports the percentage of correctly classified institutions on the basis of the prediction model reported in 
columns from 1) to 3) in Table 4. The cut-off point to identify the number of institutions that are correctly classified is defined 
by the ratio between the number of bailout institutions and the total number of observations (40/245). 
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TABLE 6: BUY AND HOLD RETURNS DURING THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND 
MARKET MEASURES OF GLOBAL SYSTEMIC IMPORTANCE BEFORE THE CRISIS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Full sample       
SIZE 10.401*** 9.669*** 8.048*** 9.661*** 12.016*** 10.446*** 
 (4.52) (4.93) (4.27) (5.10) (4.31) (5.89) 
EQUITY  -0.362 -0.355 -0.364 -0.384 -0.388 
  (0.69) (0.72) (0.70) (0.73) (0.72) 
VOLATILITY  0.516*** 0.492** 0.516*** 0.552*** 0.544** 
  (2.87) (2.59) (2.89) (3.16) (2.69) 
CAUSING OTHERS  0.103 0.025 0.103* 0.105 0.099 
  (1.52) (0.47) (1.87) (1.52) (1.55) 
CAUSED BY OTHERS  -0.021 -0.016 -0.021 -0.016 -0.026 
  (0.28) (0.22) (0.26) (0.22) (0.36) 
∆CoVaR   23.210**    
   (2.22)    
∆A_CoVaR    0.155   
    (0.03)   
SRISK     -5.021  
     (1.68)  
Ln (EXSHORT)      -1.308 
      (0.71) 
Constant -72.771** -80.113*** -67.453** -80.102*** -106.901*** -79.388*** 
 (2.53) (2.77) (2.46) (2.78) (2.86) (2.75) 
Observations 245 245 245 245 245 245 
R-squared 0.184 0.224 0.246 0.224 0.231 0.226 
Panel B: Banks       
SIZE 9.543*** 9.101*** 6.580** 8.568*** 11.473** 8.915*** 
 (3.23) (3.62) (2.34) (3.67) (2.54) (4.01) 
REG_RATIO  -1.353 -1.836 -1.463 -1.334 -1.342 
  (1.28) (1.61) (1.40) (1.25) (1.26) 
DIVERSIFICATION  27.111 12.131 28.567 22.154 28.098 
  (1.03) (0.44) (1.03) (0.81) (0.93) 
VOLATILITY  0.591*** 0.554** 0.574*** 0.614*** 0.583** 
  (2.94) (2.45) (2.89) (3.01) (2.52) 
CAUSING OTHERS  0.026 -0.089 -0.011 0.030 0.026 
  (0.43) (1.61) (0.21) (0.47) (0.43) 
CAUSED BY OTHERS  -0.126 -0.115 -0.121 -0.118 -0.126 
  (1.24) (1.18) (1.21) (1.21) (1.24) 
∆CoVaR   29.962**    
   (2.39)    
∆A_CoVaR    6.439   
    (1.06)   
SRISK     -4.374  
     (0.91)  
Ln (EXSHORT)      0.280 
      (0.09) 
Constant -62.407 -58.818 -24.885 -54.866 -84.355 -59.108 
 (1.62) (1.34) (0.51) (1.31) (1.33) (1.31) 
Observations 155 155 155 155 155 155 
R-squared 0.162 0.242 0.276 0.248 0.248 0.243 
 
Notes: This Table reports the regression results of the relationship between buy and hold returns during the global financial 
crisis (July 2007-December 2008) and the degree of systemic importance in 2006 according to market measures. SIZE is defined 
as the log transformation of firm total assets at the end of 2006, EQUITY is the ratio between equity capital and total assets, 
VOLATILITY is the stock return volatility computed with daily stock returns, CAUSING OTHERS is the number of 
financial institutions that a financial institution A is causing during year 2006 according to Granger causality tests based on daily 
stock returns, CAUSED BY OTHERS is the number of financial institutions that are a financial institution A during year 2006 
according to Granger causality tests based on daily stock returns, REG_RATIO is regulatory capital divided by risk-weighted 
assets, and DIVERSIFICATION is 1 minus the Herfindahl index of income concentration between interest and non-interest 
income. Robust t statistics clustered at the country level are reported in round brackets and *** (**;*) indicates  significant at 
1%(5%;10%).
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TABLE 7: CAPITAL SHORTFALLS DURING THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND 
MARKET MEASURES OF GLOBAL SYSTEMIC IMPORTANCE BEFORE THE CRISIS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Full sample       
SIZE 0.549*** 0.556*** 0.527*** 0.545*** 0.101 0.409*** 
 (6.56) (5.44) (5.49) (5.63) (1.24) (5.54) 
EQUITY  -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 0.001 0.002 
  (0.27) (0.24) (0.52) (0.32) (0.19) 
VOLATILITY  0.006 0.006 0.006 -0.001 0.000 
  (1.28) (1.23) (1.32) (0.30) (0.08) 
CAUSING OTHERS  0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001 
  (0.45) (0.39) (0.27) (0.36) (0.80) 
CAUSED BY OTHERS  0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
  (0.40) (0.65) (0.88) (1.01) (0.98) 
∆CoVaR   0.437**    
   (2.08)    
∆A_CoVaR    0.242*   
    (1.80)   
SRISK     0.963***  
     (5.89)  
Ln (EXSHORT)      0.241*** 
      (3.55) 
Constant -6.059*** -6.362*** -6.144*** -6.360*** -1.128 -6.382*** 
 (6.31) (5.18) (5.30) (5.53) (1.08) (6.73) 
Observations 241 241 241 241 241 241 
R-squared 0.506 0.510 0.517 0.517 0.742 0.570 
Panel B: Banks       
SIZE 0.622*** 0.640*** 0.589*** 0.625*** 0.106 0.391*** 
 (4.91) (4.97) (4.59) (4.84) (1.29) (4.08) 
REG_RATIO  0.000 -0.010 -0.003 -0.005 0.015 
  (0.01) (0.53) (0.17) (0.59) (0.91) 
DIVERSIFICATION  -1.270* -1.581** -1.230* -0.158 0.040 
  (1.90) (2.28) (1.93) (0.48) (0.06) 
VOLATILITY  0.004 0.003 0.004 -0.001 -0.007 
  (0.68) (0.56) (0.62) (0.32) (1.31) 
CAUSING OTHERS  0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001 
  (0.41) (0.57) (0.06) (0.11) (0.59) 
CAUSED BY OTHERS  0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
  (0.67) (0.87) (0.77) (0.79) (0.86) 
∆CoVaR   0.619*    
   (1.73)    
∆A_CoVaR    0.182   
    (1.20)   
SRISK     0.976***  
     (5.44)  
Ln (EXSHORT)      0.371*** 
      (4.56) 
Constant -6.873*** -6.785*** -6.095*** -6.680*** -1.035 -7.131*** 
 (4.73) (4.09) (3.67) (4.08) (0.97) (4.66) 
Observations 154 154 154 154 154 154 
R-squared 0.516 0.530 0.541 0.533 0.737 0.605 
Notes: This Table reports the regression results of the relationship between capital shortfalls during the global financial 
crisis (July 2007-December 2008) and the degree of systemic importance in 2006 according to market measures. SIZE is defined 
as the log transformation of firm total assets at the end of 2006, EQUITY is the ratio between equity capital and total assets, 
VOLATILITY is the stock return volatility computed with daily stock returns, CAUSING OTHERS is the number of 
financial institutions that a financial institution A is causing during year 2006 according to Granger causality tests based on daily 
stock returns, CAUSED BY OTHERS is the number of financial institutions that are a financial institution A during year 2006 
according to Granger causality tests based on daily stock returns, REG_RATIO is regulatory capital divided by risk-weighted 
assets, and DIVERSIFICATION is 1 minus the Herfindahl index of income concentration between interest and non-interest 
income. Robust t statistics clustered at the country level are reported in round brackets and *** (**;*) indicates  significant at 
1%(5%;10%).
 53 
TABLE 8: REALIZED COVARIANCE RISK DURING THE ASIAN CRISIS AND THE 1998 
CRISIS AND PRE-CRISES MARKET MEASURES OF GLOBAL SYSTEMIC IMPORTANCE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Asian crisis        
SIZE 0.121*** 0.131** 0.131** 0.132** 0.063 0.145** 
 (3.34) (2.75) (2.23) (2.65) (1.36) (2.59) 
EQUITY  0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.010** 0.010** 
  (2.50) (2.44) (2.46) (2.25) (2.35) 
VOLATILITY  0.239*** 0.239*** 0.239*** 0.234*** 0.246*** 
  (3.13) (3.08) (3.13) (3.03) (3.11) 
CAUSING OTHERS  0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
  (5.75) (6.04) (5.52) (5.66) (5.10) 
CAUSED BY OTHERS  0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.003* 0.003** 
  (2.27) (2.11) (2.23) (2.00) (2.23) 
∆CoVaR   0.005    
   (0.04)    
∆A_CoVaR    -0.010   
    (0.25)   
SRISK     0.129***  
     (3.82)  
Ln (EXSHORT)      -0.009 
      (0.73) 
Constant -0.452 -1.296** -1.292* -1.289** -0.595 -1.388** 
 (1.04) (2.23) (1.99) (2.26) (1.07) (2.22) 
Observations 219 219 219 219 219 219 
R-squared 0.108 0.304 0.304 0.305 0.329 0.306 
Panel B: 1998 crisis        
SIZE 0.430** 0.259 0.331 0.320 0.190 0.327 
 (2.74) (1.04) (1.18) (1.22) (0.67) (1.00) 
EQUITY  0.015 0.017 0.014 0.014 0.016 
  (0.54) (0.62) (0.52) (0.47) (0.57) 
VOLATILITY  -0.199 -0.099 -0.107 -0.202 -0.141 
  (0.79) (0.28) (0.31) (0.79) (0.43) 
CAUSING OTHERS  0.024*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 
  (3.64) (3.88) (4.16) (3.93) (3.24) 
CAUSED BY OTHERS  0.009 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.009 
  (1.01) (1.20) (1.25) (1.03) (0.95) 
∆CoVaR   -0.836    
   (1.00)    
∆A_CoVaR    -0.446   
    (1.07)   
SRISK     0.161  
     (0.96)  
Ln (EXSHORT)      -0.089 
      (0.44) 
Constant -1.082 -0.572 -1.242 -0.982 0.079 -0.779 
 (0.50) (0.18) (0.34) (0.30) (0.02) (0.22) 
Observations 219 219 219 219 219 219 
R-squared 0.050 0.237 0.252 0.255 0.241 0.239 
Notes: Panel A of this Table reports the regression results of the relationship between the realized covariance risk during 
the Asian crisis (2 nd July 1997-12th November 1997) and the degree of systemic importance in 1996 according to market 
measures. Panel B reports a similar test for the 1998 crisis (3rd August 1998 - 5th October 1998) using predictors the degree of 
systemic importance in 1997 according to market measures. SIZE is defined as the log transformation of firm total assets at the 
end of 2006, EQUITY is the ratio between equity capital and total assets, VOLATILITY is the stock return volatility computed 
with daily stock returns, CAUSING OTHERS is the number of financial institutions that a financial institution A is causing 
during year 2006 according to Granger causality tests based on daily stock returns, CAUSED BY OTHERS is the number of 
financial institutions that are a financial institution A during year 2006 according to Granger causality tests based on daily stock 
returns. Robust t statistics clustered at the country level are reported in round brackets and *** (**;*) indicates  significant at 
1%(5%;10%). 
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TABLE 9: BUY AND HOLD RETURNS DURING THE ASIAN CRISIS AND THE 1998 CRISIS 
AND PRE-CRISES MARKET MEASURES OF GLOBAL SYSTEMIC IMPORTANCE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Asian crisis        
SIZE 2.443 3.801 0.673 2.891 2.435 8.190** 
 (0.91) (1.09) (0.22) (0.83) (0.64) (2.56) 
EQUITY  0.167 0.091 0.323 0.132 -0.217 
  (0.54) (0.30) (1.06) (0.38) (0.50) 
VOLATILITY  8.408 7.853 8.447 8.299 10.475 
  (0.87) (0.82) (0.86) (0.85) (1.06) 
CAUSING OTHERS  -0.155 -0.075 -0.051 -0.148 -0.212 
  (1.19) (0.84) (0.50) (1.18) (1.63) 
CAUSED BY OTHERS  0.361** 0.280* 0.350** 0.349** 0.271* 
  (2.19) (1.89) (2.20) (2.16) (1.93) 
∆CoVaR   24.955***    
   (2.80)    
∆A_CoVaR    8.755*   
    (1.76)   
SRISK     2.586  
     (0.67)  
Ln (EXSHORT)      -2.911** 
      (2.40) 
Constant -24.192 -59.501 -40.658 -64.966* -45.500 -87.961** 
 (0.91) (1.60) (1.22) (1.76) (1.11) (2.57) 
Observations 219 219 219 219 219 219 
R-squared 0.010 0.144 0.229 0.193 0.147 0.184 
Panel B:1998 crisis        
SIZE 4.493*** 5.590*** 6.449*** 6.231*** 4.439** 5.193* 
 (2.99) (3.17) (3.40) (3.13) (2.16) (2.02) 
EQUITY   0.293 0.321 0.279 0.271 0.285 
  (1.09) (1.22) (1.12) (0.99) (0.99) 
VOLATILITY  0.428 1.631 1.409 0.380 0.089 
  (0.17) (0.56) (0.46) (0.15) (0.03) 
CAUSING OTHERS  -0.046 -0.025 -0.048 -0.030 -0.041 
  (0.65) (0.40) (0.79) (0.47) (0.61) 
CAUSED BY OTHERS  0.027 0.050 0.044 0.028 0.030 
  (0.23) (0.44) (0.40) (0.25) (0.26) 
∆CoVaR   -10.045**    
   (2.58)    
∆A_CoVaR    -4.761   
    (1.59)   
SRISK     2.666  
     (1.29)  
Ln (EXSHORT)      0.524 
      (0.23) 
Constant -25.374 -39.504 -47.552* -43.878* -28.726 -38.291 
 (1.49) (1.64) (1.82) (1.71) (1.01) (1.48) 
Observations 219 219 219 219 219 219 
R-squared 0.073 0.096 0.125 0.122 0.111 0.097 
Notes: Panel A of this Table reports the regression results of the relationship between the buy and hold returns during the 
Asian crisis (2nd July 1997-12th November 1997) and the degree of systemic importance in 1996 according to market measures. 
Panel B reports a similar test for the 1998 crisis (3rd August 1998 - 5th October 1998) using predictors the degree of systemic 
importance in 1997 according to market measures. SIZE is defined as the log transformation of firm total assets at the end of 
2006, EQUITY is the ratio between equity capital and total assets, VOLATILITY is the stock return volatility computed with 
daily stock returns, CAUSING OTHERS is the number of financial institutions that a financial institution A is causing during 
year 2006 according to Granger causality tests based on daily stock returns, CAUSED BY OTHERS is the number of financial 
institutions that are a financial institution A during year 2006 according to Granger causality tests based on daily stock returns. 
Robust t statistics clustered at the country level are reported in round brackets and *** (**;*) indicates  significant at 
1%(5%;10%). 
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TABLE 10: REALIZED CAPITAL SHORTFALL DURING THE ASIAN CRISIS AND THE 1998 
CRISIS AND PRE-CRISES MARKET MEASURES OF GLOBAL SYSTEMIC IMPORTANCE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Asian crisis        
SIZE 0.554** 0.619*** 0.611*** 0.606*** 0.111 0.464** 
 (2.70) (3.15) (2.89) (3.09) (0.91) (2.29) 
EQUITY  -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.016* 0.010 
  (0.32) (0.33) (0.12) (1.77) (0.93) 
VOLATILITY  0.290*** 0.289*** 0.291*** 0.249** 0.217 
  (2.89) (2.85) (2.93) (2.23) (1.68) 
CAUSING OTHERS  -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
  (4.41) (3.83) (3.72) (4.72) (3.57) 
CAUSED BY OTHERS  0.004 0.004 0.004 -0.001 0.007 
  (0.83) (0.79) (0.81) (0.15) (1.40) 
∆CoVaR   0.064    
   (0.33)    
∆A_CoVaR    0.122   
    (1.63)   
SRISK     0.962***  
     (5.79)  
Ln (EXSHORT)      0.103* 
      (2.05) 
Constant -5.461** -6.272*** -6.224*** -6.348*** -1.063 -5.269** 
 (2.64) (2.91) (2.78) (2.96) (0.77) (2.35) 
Observations 219 219 219 219 219 219 
R-squared 0.262 0.361 0.361 0.365 0.519 0.385 
Panel B: 1998 crisis        
SIZE 0.627*** 0.669*** 0.626*** 0.643*** 0.439* 0.349 
 (2.83) (3.04) (2.97) (2.91) (1.76) (1.65) 
EQUITY  0.010 0.009 0.011 0.006 0.003 
  (0.96) (0.79) (0.98) (0.71) (0.39) 
VOLATILITY  0.251*** 0.191*** 0.212*** 0.242*** -0.022 
  (3.51) (3.78) (3.57) (3.02) (0.25) 
CAUSING OTHERS  -0.003 -0.004** -0.003 0.000 0.001 
  (1.55) (2.59) (1.58) (0.23) (0.78) 
CAUSED BY OTHERS  0.006 0.005 0.006 0.007* 0.009** 
  (1.55) (1.28) (1.35) (1.83) (2.24) 
∆CoVaR   0.501***    
   (2.82)    
∆A_CoVaR    0.193**   
    (2.64)   
SRISK     0.531***  
     (4.46)  
Ln (EXSHORT)      0.423*** 
      (3.71) 
Constant -6.254*** -7.508*** -7.107*** -7.331*** -5.362* -6.531*** 
 (2.80) (3.04) (3.00) (2.94) (1.90) (3.35) 
Observations 219 219 219 219 219 219 
R-squared 0.329 0.419 0.435 0.429 0.550 0.530 
Notes: Panel A of this Table reports the regression results of the relationship between the realized capital shortfall during 
the Asian Crisis (2nd July 1997-12th November 1997) and the degree of systemic importance in 1996 according to market 
measures. Panel B reports a similar test for the 1998 crisis (3rd August 1998 - 5th October 1998) using predictors the degree of 
systemic importance in 1997 according to market measures. SIZE is defined as the log transformation of firm total assets at the 
end of 2006, EQUITY is the ratio between equity capital and total assets, VOLATILITY is the stock return volatility computed 
with daily stock returns, CAUSING OTHERS is the number of financial institutions that a financial institution A is causing 
during year 2006 according to Granger causality tests based on daily stock returns, CAUSED BY OTHERS is the number of 
financial institutions that are a financial institution A during year 2006 according to Granger causality tests based on daily stock 
returns. Robust t statistics clustered at the country level are reported in round brackets and *** (**;*) indicates  significant at 
1%(5%;10%). 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                     
i See also “Lax Oversight Caused Crisis, Bernanke Says” in New York Times, January 3, 2010. 
ii One such rule has been established by the Basel Committee (2011) on banking supervision, in a document published in July 
2011, which has called for more stringent capital requirements on banks deemed to be globally systemically important.  
iii The Shapley Value approach is a game-theoretic instrument which have been used to assesses how important each 
financial institution is for the overall system and what payoff it can expect from interacting with other financial 
institutions. The purpose is to quantify how financial institutions contribute to a systemic event given the possibility 
that a financial institution adds to the propagation of shocks in the system and because it is itself exposed to 
propagated shocks (Drehmann and Tarashev, 2011a). The Shapley Value approach, however, suffers from a 
dimensionality problem; namely, for a system of N banks there are 2N possible subsystems for which the systemic 
risk indicator needs to be calculated. Therefore, applications of the contribution approach (see Tarashev, Borio, and 
Tsatsaronis 2010; Drehmann and Tarashev, 2011; Gauthier, Lehar, and Souissi 2012) are generally limited to small 
samples of financial institutions. 
iv Danielsson et al. (2014) identify several additional sources of errors-in-variables related to the use of asset returns 
rather equity returns that do not refer to the heterogeneity of accounting principles. In particular, the estimation of 
asset returns requires ad-hoc interpolation to transform annual (or at best quarterly) accounting data to daily asset 
return observations. In addition, some ad hoc method is also required to transform book data to market data. 
Furthermore, publicly reported asset values do not consider off-balance sheet items that can be very substantial in 
financial institutions.    
v As reported by Ng, Vasvari, and Moerman (2011), the capital support was initially provided to ten banks: Bank of 
America, Bank of New York Mellon, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, State 
Streets, Wachovia Corporation and Wells Fargo. Merrill Lynch and Wachovia Corporation were then acquired by 
Bank of America and Wells Fargo, respectively, with deals completed by December 2008. As a result, the capital 
infusions planned for Merrill Lynch and Wachovia Corporation went to the acquiring banks.  
vi In line with this view, the proposal of the Basel Committee (2011) on the design of capital requirements for 
systemically important banks recognizes a key role for proxies of the degree of interconnectedness of a firm. 
